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ABSTRACT
Although proponents of alternative health care systems
(HMOs) have touted the potential savings created by
increased competition, actual savings have failed to match
expectations. Annual health care budgets at many
corporations continue to rise at a rate which exceeds that
seen by the federal government. Some companies have
responded to these pressures by adding multiple option
benefit programs to satisfy their employees' health care
needs.
The availability of multiple plans has complicated the
decision which consumers must make. As open enrollment
occurs on an annual basis, a choice of health care coverage
must be made each year. While some consumers choose to
remain in the same plan, others change from one option to
another. Those individuals who change plans may do so to
save money or to seek services otherwise not available
through their current plan. This study has examined the
frequency of such plan changes or switches, and the factors
which account for them.
Under certain circumstances, a special form of self-
selection, known as adverse selection, may occur. In a
community rating environment, adverse selection can drive a
continuing escalation of health care costs. This study
examines the implications of self-selection in a community
rating environment.
A large southwestern utility company operating under
such an environment was selected for this study. The
comprehensive database maintained by the company allowed an
integrated analysis in which factors previously studied
separately could be examined simultaneously in a consistent
manner.
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Although Neipp and Zeckhauser have suggested that
people persist in their health care arrangements, the
findings at this location show that nearly half (47%) of all
individuals changed their health care coverage during the 3
year study period and nearly one-seventh (14%) switched
plans 2 or more times during the same period. In addition,
specific plan-switching patterns were found to be associated
with distinctive profiles of health care utilization. For
example, dependent males (under 18 years of age) who
switched from an HMO to the company sponsored indemnity plan
had almost 7.5 times the total health expenditures than
dependent males who switched to HMOs, and almost twice that
of their non-switching counterparts. Other plan-switching
sequences were associated with interesting patterns in the
usage of obstetrical and mental health services.
The results of this study are relevant not only to a
theoretical understanding of self-selection, but to
practical problems of maintaining employee satisfaction with
health care programs through effective marketing strategies
and appropriate benefit design.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
9
I. ISSUE
The decision surrounding the selection of health care
insurance is one of the most important individual choices
made under uncertainty (Ellis 1985). However, why
individuals make changes in their health care coverage is
not well understood. This study examines the existence of
switching populations, reasons for switching, and whether
there are specific categories of switchers which can be
identified. By identifying factors which underlie health
care selection, this thesis not only helps in understanding
self-selection, but also helps organizations maintain
employee satisfaction with health care programs through
effective marketing strategies and appropriate benefit
design.
The implications of self-selection in a community
rating environment are considerable. If the current system
remains unchecked (i.e. no negative feedback to deter or
stop the positive loop1 ), then costs associated with health
1the positive loop consists of the following variables:
company costs per covered individual, company premiums per
individual, company payments to HMO per covered individual,
individual HMO premium payments, HMO risk pool, Indemnity risk
pool and total company costs. The HMO's actual costs are removed
from the equation when community rating methods are used.
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care benefits will continue to rise until they can no longer
be supported by most companies.
Therefore, this study was undertaken to provide
additional insight on the frequency of switching, the
reasons for switching, and the potential implications of
these findings for policy makers and corporate benefit
managers.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1960, the United States was spending approximately
5.3% of its gross national product (GNP) on health care (AMA
1987). By 1970, this figure had risen to 7.6% (AMA 1987).
In an effort to control rising health care costs, congress
passed the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act in
1973. However, by 1987, the percentage of the GNP devoted
to health care had risen to 11.5%, and current estimates for
the year 2000 approach 15% (HCFA 1987).
The HMO Act was designed to promote the creation of
Health Maintenance Organizations--competitive alternatives
to the fee-for-service health care delivery system. HMOs
differ from the fee-for-service system in many ways,
although the major differing factor is the reimbursement
mechanism. HMOs use prospective payment systems, whereas
11
fee-for-service systems are paid per service
retrospectively, or after the care has been rendered.
Indemnity insurance plans, which encompass most company
sponsored plans, are based on a retrospective fee-for-
service system. While both systems provide inpatient
hospitalization coverage, outpatient services are usually
fee-for-service for indemnity subscribers whereas HMOs
provide outpatient services for the prepaid amount.
The HMO Act promoted competition by mandating "dual
choice." Dual choice required employers who offer health
plans as a benefit to allow their employees to apply these
benefits to HMO membership (McNeil 1975).2 By inducing
competition in this manner, HMOs were to help reduce total
health care expenditures.
Unfortunately, as is the case with most government
expenditures for health care, corporate health care costs
have also increased dramatically. The health care budgets
and projections for a large utility company for the years
1987 through 1992 are presented in Figure 1. This graph
shows a 22% annual increase in the cost of providing health
care for its employees.
2 employers with less than 25 employees were excluded.
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FIGURE 1
Most corporate attempts to curb health care spending
have been ineffective, at best. Some observers have even
suggested that companies have little concern for the costs
of employee health care benefits (Sapolsky 1981). One
reason for this apparent lack of concern is that companies
who self-insure are now having to compete for their
employees' health care premium dollars. In response to
competitive pressures form both federal mandates and
consumer demands, companies are now offering a wide variety
of health care benefits for their employees. Many companies
continue to add plans and benefits to their health care menu
to satisfy those who prefer a choice of locations, doctors,
13
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prices, facilities, or structures. In a time of budget cuts
and cost containment strategies, these demands are becoming
much harder to meet and the complexity and numbers of these
additions have left many consumers unable to decide which
plan to choose.
While this complexity leads many consumers to select a
plan which may not suit their needs, others are able to take
advantage of this opportunity and select a plan which may
better meet their health care needs.3 For some, this means
they remain in the same plan, be it an indemnity plan or an
HMO. For others, the complexity leads to changes in plans--
changes from one HMO to a different HMO, from an indemnity
plan to an HMO, or from an HMO to an indemnity plan.
Changes like these could create an imbalance in the risk
sharing of the insured populations. This imbalance has the
potential to produce serious consequences for our current
medical system.
When open enrollment occurs, a multi-step decision
process occurs.4 Although most plans provide basic levels
3 personal interviews with corporate managers and
employees
40pen enrollment is another facet of the HMO Act of
1973. This requirement provides an annual opportunity for
individuals to enroll in a health care option of their
choice.
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of health and hospitalization insurance, there are often
slight differences in the benefits available from one plan
to another, beyond premium cost. If choices are made based
upon service need, then plans which offer specific services
which are not covered elsewhere may also receive a higher
risk population for those services. For example, if an
infertility program is covered in one plan but only offered
at additional expenses through others, then patients with
infertility concerns may well choose that plan during the
next open enrollment period.
Given numerous health care options and little or no
cost associated with switching health care plans; rational5,
informed consumers are likely to change plans whenever it is
in their perceived interest to do so. These consumers,
using private information about their expected health care
needs, will make decisions which will affect health care
costs for their organizations. Unless employers have access
to this same information or can price discriminate between
individuals, their ability to cost-shift or cross-subsidize
health care plans becomes limited.
5for the purposes of this paper, rational will be
defined as the behavior of choosing a health plan on the
basis of seeking cost savings or specific services.
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Although HMOs are recruiting larger portions of
corporate populations, the cost savings touted by many
proponents have not yet been realized. One explanation for
this is that consumers select health plans according to
their economic and health care needs, thereby removing the
company's ability to adequately cross-subsidize high risk
populations. When self-selective behavior is combined with
a financial rating system such as that in community rating
mechanisms6, a positive feedback loop exists and costs will
continue to escalate. The financial arrangement between
many HMOs and companies offers little hope of adequately
spreading the financial risk associated with the provision
of health care across our society.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2
discusses the concepts of self-selection, the reasons for
switching health care plans, and implications of these
topics. Chapter 3 develops the research design and
questions. Chapter 4 contains the methodology used for this
thesis including site selection, descriptions of data and
plan characteristics, analysis with test descriptions and a
predictive model. Results are then presented in chapter 5,
6Community and experience are the two basic rating
methods. Experience rating determines the price based upon
previous experience for a particular group or individual.
Community rating, on the other hand, bases price on the
average costs for the entire community served.
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and chapter 6 contains a discussion of the results, and
conclusions. Chapter 7 contains the suggestions for further
research and the appendices and bibliography follow.
17
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
18
Many years have passed since the introduction of the
HMO Act in 1973. HMOs have been shown to deliver acceptable
quality of care with reduced hospitalization rates thereby
reducing costs of health care for their subscribers (Luft
1987). However, the cost savings which proponents suggested
have yet to reach purchasers of HMO services such as the
federal government and private corporations.
One factor which could account for this discrepancy is
self-selection of health care plans by subscribers. This
factor has even greater implications when combined with a
community rating reimbursement mechanism. This chapter will
discuss the available literature on these topics. The self-
selection literature includes definitions, the existence of
self-selection, and reasons for self-selective behavior.
Rating schemes and alternatives will then briefly be
discussed, followed by a review of the implications of these
concepts.
19
I. SELF-SELECTION
I.A. Consumer Directed Self-selection
What is meant by switching and self-selection? For the
purposes of this study, switches are defined as voluntary
changes in health care coverage which result in the
selection of a new plan. Voluntary switching implies self-
selection. In fact, since HMOs must voluntarily enroll
their members, HMO enrollment is, in itself, self-selective.
Occasionally, when people change health plans, the
change is not voluntary. When an individual loses his/her
job, moves away from the service area of a particular plan,
or transfers to another company, an involuntary change in
health care coverage occurs. It is important to distinguish
these changes from those which occur when an individual
changes voluntarily. The voluntary switch might be amenable
to certain benefit or policy modifications.
Self-selection is the non-random selection of a plan
which may affect health care costs when "...some, perhaps
unknown, factor about the insured population influencing
service use and costs is not factored into the calculation
of the payment" (Wilensky 1986). This type of behavior
20
could well lead to the following biases described by
Wilensky and Rossiter (1986):
Bias in patient self selection is said to be
adverse when higher than average expected risks
are enrolled for a prospective capitated payment.
Favorable selection is said to occur when lower
than average risks enroll.
For example, it is often suggested in the literature
that younger, healthier people join HMOs (favorable
selection) whereas older, more unhealthy, individuals use
indemnity plans (adverse selection). While many suggest
that selection bias occurs (see appendix A), others have
found cases where this is not true (Neipp and Zeckhauser
1985).
On the other hand, the opposite scenario which has not
been the subject of much debate can also be constructed.
Healthy individuals, the bulk of most populations, may
default into the indemnity plan, while individuals who
expect to use a large number of outpatient services may
select an HMO. For example, families with small children
may select an HMO because the per visit out-of-pocket
expense is substantially lower than that of the indemnity
plan.
An important point to note in such an example is the
difference in magnitude between outpatient and inpatient
expenditures. While a population may require more
21
outpatient services per year, the cost of a single inpatient
episode could be more than 100 times the amount than for all
outpatient services combined. Therefore we must be cautious
when considering the utilization statistics of a given
population.
Although many studies have attempted to show that
adverse selection occurs (Appendix A), most were
inconclusive or found no evidence of selection bias. The
majority of these studies address only those individuals
selecting an HMO from an indemnity plan and not individuals
switching between health care plans more generally (i.e.
from HMO to HMO, HMO to indemnity, or vice versa). In all
cases however, time series data pertinent to the proposed
study either were not available or were not analyzed.
The literature debate about adverse self-selection is
unresolved. HMOs allege that it doesn't occur, and
corporate indemnity plans vow that adverse selection will
limit the days remaining that health care will be provided
as a benefit. With a careful review of the literature, one
would be hard pressed to say that adverse selection does not
occur. However, while there may be some agreement as to
whether or not adverse selection occurs, there is certainly
no agreement as to the amount or direction.
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I.B. Externally Directed Self-selection
In general, "cream skimming" and "sludge passing"
occurs when health plans attempt to influence consumer's
selection by placing incentives which will induce a specific
behavior. Cream skimming has been defined as the ability to
attract the lowest risk population, whereas sludge passing
is the ability to deter high risk populations. Newhouse
(1982) suggests that selection biases are not only caused by
the patient. Specific selection of low-risk patients may be
performed by prepaid medical plans. This can be
accomplished by a determination of person-specific
predictable portions of risk and "efforts to persuade higher
than average risks to disenroll," in effect, introducing
additional external forces on an individual's selection of
health care.
Examples of these forces can be found throughout the
literature. Cream skimming may be found when an HMO offers
well baby care under the assumption that the younger and
healthier families will be attracted because of the benefit
and will be lower overall risks to the HMO. Sludge passing,
on the other hand, can be represented by the following
example. A mother has a sick child in need of medical care.
If there is inadequate parking at her plan's medical
facility, the wait in the waiting room is quite long, a
23
series of allied health professionals see the child before a
physician is called and when the physician does arrive,
he/she treats the mother impersonally, the likelihood that
the arrangement will continue the following year is fairly
remote. Due to the mandatory open enrollment periods, these
patients will obtain coverage from an unsuspecting plan
during the next sign-up period. However, the fact that the
patient's initial plan was able to deter the patient from
re-enrolling, by whatever means, is an example of sludge
passing.
II. FREQUENCY OF SWITCHING
Neipp and Zeckhauser's work (1985) on "persistence" at
both the Polaroid Corporation and Harvard University
suggests that people stay with their health care
arrangements and do not often switch. They found that 97%
of consumers at Polaroid and Harvard remained in the same
health care plan for the years 1984-1985. This short time
period limits the study's ability to determine the extent of
switching. Although no empirical studies have been found
which indicate that switching is prevalent, interviews with
company employees suggest that switching might not be so
uncommon.
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On the other hand, Ellis' work (1985) on employee
health care plan choice suggests that consumers may be
willing to change within a specific type of coverage (within
indemnity plans or within HMOs). However, his study does
not incorporate time series data; the health plan options
analyzed consisted of only three indemnity plans (HMO
membership was so low it was excluded); and the locations
selected limited the ability to adequately represent both
members and their dependents.7
III. REASONS FOR SWITCHING
The literature suggests many reasons why individuals
might enroll or disenroll from a health care plan. Reasons
for voluntary switches will be considered as follows: those
topics likely to affect the risk-sharing pool, such as 1)
ECONOMIC REASONS, and 2) SERVICE REQUIREMENTS; and those
unlikely to affect the risk-sharing pool such as 3)
DISSATISFACTION, and 4) EXPERIMENTATION.
For the purposes of this study, "rational" switching
will encompass the purchase of a health care plan which will
7The locations studied provided the opportunity for
changing as a family unit but would not permit interfamily
changes.
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minimize the costs for a covered individual. We can define
this cost minimization in two forms. The first is for those
individuals seeking a reduction in their premiums, expected
out-of-pocket expenses or other associated costs. The
second occurs when individuals select coverage based upon a
required (or expected) service need.
III.A. Economic Reasons
III.A.1. Expenses
III.A.l.a. Direct expenses
If rational, a purchase decision should be made at the
point at which the marginal benefit outweighs the marginal
cost for the expected services. Although costs and benefits
vary from individual to individual, direct costs typically
include: the premium, which is often deducted from the
monthly paycheck of the member; the deductible, or those
costs which must be paid by the subscriber before the
insurance begins its coverage; and the copayment, which is
that fraction of costs beyond the deductible borne by the
26
subscriber. The "out-of-pocket expenses" usually refer to
the deductible, copayment, or other nuisance fee. 8
Many papers in the literature suggest that the impact
of the premium expense should be discounted since
individuals often are unaware of the payment or amount.
This is because consumers are divorced from physically
making the payment. While this might be true for many, the
number of knowledgeable consumers who are aware of their
health care costs is growing rapidly.
The financial loss hypothesis is directed at the
economics of the health care decision (Berki 1971). This
suggests that individuals will enroll "...in a plan which,
other things being equal, reduces the financial costs of
utilization" (Berki 1971). In other words, consumers will
try to minimize costs while selecting a plan which provides
the benefits they need or believe they will need.
8This is usually seen as a $2.00 or $5.00 fee at the
time of the visit.
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III.A.l.b. Indirect Expenses
III.A.l.b.(1). Transition costs
For individuals making decisions each year on their
health care arrangements, the decision to change from one
plan to another can involve many costs other than just those
suggested above. A health care change typically involves
severing a physician-patient relationship and shopping for
new care-givers at both emotional and economic expense. The
change might also involve further driving distances or
increased paperwork.
The literature has suggested various theories on
transition costs. Luft (1987) has stated that those
individuals who are the highest utilizers of health services
are more likely to have close patient-physician
relationships and therefore have very high transition costs
associated with breaking these bonds. It has also been
suggested that individuals with high health service
utilization will migrate towards health care coverage which
has the lowest per visit cost. These are not mutually
exclusive, however, the per visit cost is often lowest in
the HMO.
28
III.A.l.b.(2). Convenience costs
When dependents are involved in the health care
equation, personal interviews with company employees and the
general public suggest that care issues tend to become
skewed toward care for dependents. That is, if the family
is required to make health care decisions as a unit rather
than as individuals, the health care decision generally is
in support of that decision most convenient for the
dependents. Convenience might refer to the selection of a
health plan which would provide the closest, fastest and
"best" medical care for the dependents. This would include
such factors as parking and proximity. This suggests that
while there might be convenient access for the member at
their work location, decisions are often made for the spouse
and/or children at home.
III.A.2. Benefits of Health Care
The benefits of health care are more intangible. While
good health may seem the obvious benefit derived from health
care, other benefits including convenience, "quality medical
29
care", plan and provider satisfaction, and health status
have all been considered as benefits.9
III.B. Service Requirements
Another influence on the choice of a health care plan
which isn't directly related to out-of-pocket expenses or
premiums occurs when individuals change plans because of a
particular service requirement or perceived need. Certainly
it could be said that these services might also be purchased
outside of the normal range of services which their previous
plan covered; however, this would probably occur at
significant financial cost. While arguments could be made
that these are also economic decisions like the out-of-
pocket and premium decisions, they will be considered
separate issues for now. Changes made for specific service
requirements will therefore be examined.
By service requirements, it is meant that a switch
occurs based upon a difference in the benefit coverage
between the previous and the newly selected health plan.
Enthoven (1980) described a family which had a choice
between a low-premium plan with high copayments and an HMO
9personal interviews with company employees
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with a high premium but comprehensive coverage. The family
chose the low premium option until they learned that all
four of their children required open heart surgery. During
the next enrollment period, the family switched to the
comprehensive coverage for the surgery. The following open
enrollment period, the family returned to the low-premium
option. While this might seem a rather drastic example, it
does provide an example of rational purchasing of health
care. It also suggests that in situations which allow
dependents to switch independently from the employee,
dependent care may require separate analysis. Neipp and
Zeckhauser (1985) later categorized this as opportunistic
switching.
The literature on specific service utilization is
inconclusive. Berki (1977) has found that while demographic
differences exist between populations that select HMOs and
those who do not, no significant differences were found in
prior health care service utilization. Lewis (1984), on the
other hand, in a comparison of data from six months of
ambulatory services, found that the HMO population made
significantly more visits than their disenrolled
counterparts. Welch and Frank (1986) used a national data
set to examine the variation between HMO enrollees and
conventional insurees. No significant differences were
found in their analysis of the number of medical conditions
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or health status. Since many HMOs are reluctant to release
data, adequate comparisons of utilization have been few.
III.B.1. Perceived Needs
The majority of service needs or requirements are
expected or perceived needs. These perceptions may be based
upon previous need (i.e. chronic conditions) or expected
need, as in the case of pregnancy and well-baby care.
However, Ellis (1985) suggests that some consumers are poor
forecasters of the future quantity and type of medical care.
There is also evidence that consumers misperceive dollars
spent on services the previous year (Ellis 1985).
In the face of a competitive market, some consumers
identify specific service needs and the dollar amounts
associated with this care to more appropriately select the
health plan which will maximize benefits and minimize
cost. 10 Bice (1975) has suggested the risk perception
hypothesis to describe this phenomenon. This theory states
that the higher a person's subjectively perceived need for
medical care, the more likely it is that the individual will
select a plan which offers the more comprehensive, more
accessible benefit package, when all else is constant.
10 personal interviews with company employees making
health care switches.
32
III.C. Dissatisfaction
In a study by Sorensen and Wersinger (1981),
disenrollees were found to have much higher levels of
dissatisfaction than their counterparts who remained in the
HMO. Lewis (1984) suggests that the reasons for
disenrollment involve differing medical needs. There does
not appear to be a consensus as to the reasons for
disenrollment from an HMO to an indemnity plan, nor is there
agreement on reasons for a change from indemnity to HMO.
The findings which do appear consistent throughout the
literature are that the people who change to an HMO are
likely to be female, younger, and have large families.
Consumers who change from an HMO to the indemnity plan tend
to have been with their employer (and the HMO as well) for a
shorter period, and are more likely to be female.
Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty concept (1970) has
also been brought into the health care arena. In the terms
of the literature today, "exit" would be "disenrollment."
"Voice" could be seen as labor negotiations over health care
benefits and increased use of patient advocate or complaint
departments. "Loyalty", on the other hand, might be best
described when people use the voice option to improve their
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surroundings and remain in their company's health plan.
Loyalty may also be an important factor in Neipp and
Zeckhauser's persistence theory.
The concepts of voice and loyalty as Hirschman has
suggested describe the majority of the employees at most
large corporations. When a major problem arises, either
discussions are undertaken to arrive at a solution or a
strike ensues. A strike over health care benefits might be
perceived as part "voice" and part "loyalty" for this could
be used to improve the state of affairs at the organization.
At many companies where there is self-insurance, many people
feel compelled to stay within the company's plan out of
their feelings of loyalty.ll Still others with whom we have
spoken suggest that the possibility of internal knowledge
and breaks in confidentiality are so great that they would
prefer pay for all services out-of-pocket.
III.D. EXPERIMENTATION
Many articles have been written about disenrollment
from prepaid group practices or HMOs. Mechanic, Weiss and
Cleary (1983) found that individuals who disenrolled did so
11personal interviews with company employees
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because they were less likely to have adequate knowledge of
the prepaid group practices' actual operation prior to
selection of that plan. We might consider these individuals
"experimenting" with different plans while they are learning
which is best for them.
Although presenting such low figures for the switching
population, Neipp and Zeckhauser (1985) have given reasons
why people might change their health care arrangement. The
first two reasons given are that an individual is learning
about a plan or learning about himself. Another occurs when
the consumer has a change in preference.
When an individual is learning about a plan or one's
self, there is often experimentation. As people learn more
about themselves and their needs and preferences, they may
try different health care options to determine which plan is
best for them. This "taste test" behavior combines Neipp
and Zeckhauser's reasons given above.
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IV. EFFECTS OF SWITCHING
IV.A. Start-up Phenomenon
The start-up phenomenon refers to the increase in
health care utilization due to re-establishing a medical
record and base line medical information associated with the
adoption of a new health plan. While no literature has
successfully quantified this phenomenon, the concept could
prove to be a major concern. When one considers that if
people are changing health care arrangements with any
frequency, not only does this present the possibility of
increased costs due to this start-up phenomenon, but this
also raises concerns about the lack of continuity of care.
IV.B. Health care dynamics
If, as Lairson (1987) suggests, a company's younger and
healthier employees switch to an HMO, leaving the supposedly
older, more costly contracts in the indemnity plan, then the
average cost to provide health care for the remaining
population increases. If the costs of the HMO are based
upon the average figure for the more costly company
contracts, then it also follows that the potential savings
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for these healthier individuals will not be able to cross-
subsidize the more costly contracts.
In an environment where both adverse selection and
community rating mechanisms exist, a positive feedback loop
is created which will continue to escalate costs. Unless
the actual costs associated with the provision of health
care are those paid, then the loop will continue and HMOs
will appreciate increasing premiums without seeing the
increasing costs associated with the higher risk population.
V. SUMMARY
It has been suggested that health care changes are not
a common occurrence. It has also been suggested that people
are not rational buyers of health care. However, it has
been the author's experience that certain categories of
individuals contradict both of these theories.
The persistence phenomenon suggests that roughly 97% of
employees remain in the same health plan (Neipp and
Zeckhauser 1985). However, the study which produced these
findings excluded dependent care. Another concern about
these findings is that they are the results from a single
open enrollment period. That is, these are the results of
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one year. If these findings are extrapolated to five and
ten year persistence rates, at five years only 85% (.975) of
the original group remains, at ten years the numbers fall to
approximately 74% (.9710) and at 20 years the figures fall
to 54% (.9720).
However, if one assumes that switching might occur, and
that switching could induce the start-up phenomenon, and
that some switching occurs because of cream skimming and
sludge passing, then it follows that switching could lead to
increased costs depending on the magnitude of the switching
population, their health care needs, and the payment
mechanisms in place.
In fact, in a dynamic system such as the health care
industry today, when self-selection and inappropriate rating
schemes are used without corrective capabilities, a positive
feedback loop exists which will continue an escalating cost
cycle. Unless corrected, this loop will continue its upward
spiral until the expense can no longer be maintained and
health care will cease to be corporate benefit.
Although efforts to control health care costs have not
yet proven successful, Luft (1986) has suggested creating
mandatory basic benefit packages, periodic open enrollments
and payment adjustments in order to control rising health
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care costs. The payment adjustments would be based upon
risk differentials between populations. These could work as
a negative factor to assist in the control of the positive
feedback loops described.
Another suggestion comes from Enthoven (1978, 1989).
He has suggested an alternative cost-saving plan, called the
"Consumer Choice Health Plan (CCHP)." Under this plan,
various tax incentives are used to promote proper allocation
of resources. The relevance here, aside from the national
encouragement for such a plan, is that Enthoven suggests
that in the CCHP a "tax credit at 60 per cent of actuarial
cost would limit the potential for people to manipulate the
system to their advantage by taking a minimum-cost
'catastrophic insurance' plan when they expect to be
healthy, and then switching to a full-benefit plan when they
anticipated elective surgical procedures or pregnancy."
Given the political climate surrounding health care, it
is unclear if any of these corrective measures will be
implemented on a national basis. However, some companies,
concerned about their own viability, are researching each
alternative closely.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN
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In this chapter, the discussion will focus on designing
a study show whether or not switching occurs, the reasons
for switching, and the potential implications of switching.
The central hypothesis will be given first, with the
supporting hypotheses following.
The supporting hypotheses will consider the frequency
of switching, followed by the reasons for switching. The
section related to the reasons for switching will focus on
the two aspects discussed earlier, cost saving and service
seeking switches.
I. CENTRAL HYPOTHESES
The central hypothesis of this thesis is as follows:
H 1:Individuals with expected health care
requirements will change plans in an effort
to maximize benefits or minimize costs. Or,
more simply, individuals change health plans
when it is their best interest to do so.
This hypothesis might be verified by searching specific
insured populations for whether switching occurs over time
and if so, whether it arises for cost-saving or service-
41
seeking reasons. With limited resources and time, a
retrospective design would seem most appropriate and most
cost-effective. Therefore, we might begin with the
assumption that such populations exist, and that historical
data could be collected on employment, plan membership,
medical claims information, and preferably interview data
from the switching population.
In order to examine the existence of switching
populations and their reasons for switching, each could be
developed into a hypothesis with supporting research
questions.
II. FREQUENCY OF SWITCHING
To examine whether health care plan switching is
common, the frequency of voluntary switches shall be
determined. Information required to estimate switching
frequencies include historical data per covered individual
on voluntary changes in health plans from one year to the
next. Such changes could be determined as follows. If
employment information were available that included address,
work location, and dates of employment and eligibility, then
any change in plan membership which occurred during a period
in which all of the employment information is voluntary.
42
This classification allows for exclusion of individuals who
left an employer, moved out of the service area, changed to
student status, were part-time employees, or individuals who
had died.
This data could then be analyzed to show the numbers of
switches which occurred per individual during a study period
or for the population to determine whether or not switching
occurs and the extent of involvement.
The answer to this would provide information on the
potential importance of switching on the risk pool. That
is, if switching does not occur, it probably would not pose
any concerns. If it does occur, we need to know the extent
of the population involved and determine the potential
implications.
III. REASONS FOR SWITCHING
The focus for this study includes the factors which
affect the sharing of risk between health plans. As
discussed earlier, reasons related to costs and service
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requirements are most likely to alter the risk pool and
therefore need to be determined.
A survey of switchers is one way to assess reasons for
switching. However, since many people are likely to be
unable to remember why, or when a change was made,
additional information is required for verification.
In particular, data on historical plan descriptions and
costs, medical claims information, employment and
eligibility information, are used to validate interviews of
the switching population.
III.A. Cost Saving Switches
Three hypotheses on whether consumers switch health
care plans for cost saving reasons are tested:
H1: The incidence of switching is affected by
changes in premiums. In particular, as
premiums increase, switching away from the
increase would be expected.
H2: The copayment amounts are different between
those who switch and those who don't. Here we
might expect copayment amounts to be lower than
the controls for those individuals switching
from an indemnity plan to an HMO if those
individuals selecting HMOs are healthier and
higher than the controls for those individuals
returning to the indemnity plan from an HMO.
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H3: The deductible amounts are different between
those who switch and those who don't. Here we
might expect deductible amounts to be lower
than the controls for those individuals
switching from an indemnity plan to an HMO if
those individuals selecting HMOs are healthier
and higher than the controls for those
individuals returning to the indemnity plan
from an HMO.
In order to determine whether switching occurs because
of cost factors, medical claims data and plan information
are examined. Switches to save costs are defined as
switches which provide a reduction in expenditures to the
covered individual. To determine whether this type of
switch occurs, premium differences between the original plan
and the selected plan are compared along with the deductible
and copayment. Historical plan data are gathered from
materials made available to individuals during the
applicable open enrollment periods.
Each of the above hypotheses can be tested more
precisely by examining the type of switch. Two switching
samples are identified: individuals who switch from the
indemnity plan to an HMO, and those who switch from the HMO
to the indemnity plan.
Copayment and deductible amounts would increase for
individuals using a higher number or more expensive
services. Therefore, if we assume that more healthy
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consumers switch to HMOs, we would expect their copayments
and deductibles to be significantly lower than non-
switchers. On the other hand, those returning to the
indemnity plan may have confounding factors affecting their
data. Not only might the individual be making the switch
based upon a specific need (whether to save money or use a
specific service) which would create higher figures, but
their return might induce the start-up effect which would
also affect the data.
III.B. Service Seeking Switches
As there are many services which may be considered,
those which are most representative of health care costs
should be examined. These services include obstetrical,
mental health, inpatient, surgical, non-network provider
use, SCE physician use, and prescriptive utilization. We
test whether there are differences in the number of claims
for each of these services and the dollar amounts charged.
The following hypothesis is posed:
H4: There are differences in dollar amounts charged
or number of claims used for Y service between
groups that switch and those that don't.
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where Y is each of the following respectively: obstetrical,
mental health, inpatient, surgical, outside physician
use, and inside physician use.
Expectations are that the null hypothesis would be
rejected based upon the findings for the majority of these
figures being lower for the population switching to the HMO.
This will probably have an exception. Given the well-baby
care provided at HMOs, we expect to see higher figures for
obstetrical care for those individuals going to HMOs. This,
presumably, is a tradeoff offered by the HMO to attract
individuals with lower total health care costs. Examples of
reasons for individuals switching from an indemnity plan to
an HMO are that specific outpatient services are available
at lower out-of-pocket expense to the patient.
The service seeking switches could be determined by
examining claims data and interviewing switchers.
Specific services received greater depth of coverage in
an indemnity plan than in HMOs. We examine whether specific
services are being used to a greater extent by individuals
switching to a particular plan, since this implies that
switches are made to satisfy the demand for a particular
service.
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Both cost saving and service seeking motives are tested
using data analysis based on historical medical claims and
eligibility data. However, an even stronger case could be
made if individuals would tell us why they were about to
make a switch prior to the switch itself. As this is
designed to be a retrospective analysis, individuals could
be asked why they made a particular switch. Recall would
not be expected to be 100% but responses would allow
additional confirmation of the claims and eligibility data.
Expected responses might be that individuals who switched
from the indemnity plan to an HMO suggest that they had
switched based on the cost savings and service availability
for dependent care. Therefore, survey information should be
collected to provide additional support for this hypothesis.
Specific research questions which could address these
events include:
Why are changes in coverage made?
Are there specific service requirements of switchers,
and do these requirements change depending on the
pattern of switch (HMO to Indemnity, HMO to HMO,
Indemnity to HMO)?
The answers to these would provide guidance to both
benefit managers and rate setters. If switching does alter
risk sharing, then benefit managers may decide to respond to
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specific reasons for switching and rate setters may want to
re-evaluate the mechanisms by which reimbursements are made.
An example might come from well baby care. If younger,
healthier individuals switch to HMOs for well baby care,
then their potentially lower costs would have been passed to
the HMO as would their premiums, thereby increasing the
overall cost per covered individual at the company. If so,
corporate benefit managers may wish to add coverage for well
baby care to attract and maintain the lower cost
individuals. On the other hand, if the sociodemographic
characteristics of the plans are so different that a
comparable risk sharing arrangement is not feasible, then
rate setters may need to incorporate these differences into
the payment and rating mechanisms.
Specific categories of beneficiaries which might also
be identified from data include members, dependents, women
in childbearing ages, children for well-baby care, elderly
and the Medicare population. We might also learn from
differences within and between each of the groups. We can
formulate a hypothesis based upon these beneficiaries:
H5: Specific categories of beneficiaries, because
of their special health care needs, will be
most likely to switch.
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If there are groups whose cost or service needs are
unmet, it might be desirable to add a benefit modification
to maintain satisfaction among the employees and
subscribers.
In addition to the above listed questions, the
following should also be posed to help identify or predict
the switching population and any possible effects which
their actions may have on both the current and future
medical system:
4) Does the likelihood of change depend on previous
utilization or service need?
5) Are previous "switchers" more or less likely to
change?
Numbers 4 and 5 offer the capability to predict future
switching behavior.
6) Are "switchers" the highest utilizers of health
care compared to their non-switching age-sex
adjusted counterparts?
7) Are "switchers" the most expensive utilizers of
health care compared to their non-switching age-
sex adjusted counterparts?
Numbers 6 and 7 may provide insight as to future
budgeting concerns.
8) Are "switchers" demographically different from
their non-switching counterparts?
9) What do these change patterns suggest about the
demographic characteristics about each of the
options in the future?
10) What do the migration patterns suggest about
future patterns?
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This final group of research questions (8, 9, and 10)
could be the most helpful for long-term corrective factors.
Rate setters, policy makers and plan managers could benefit
from this information. These will assist in the planning
and design of benefits packages. Also important, in light
of current legislative concern about unfunded corporate
pension liabilities, are the possible implications with
respect to such liabilities.
These questions also raise other issues. For example,
how often do people switch? Are their reasons different
each time? Are switches based only on an individual's
perceived expected costs (both out-of-pocket expenses and
premium payments) or are there other reasons (location,
preference of doctor, facility choice, service availability,
etc.) that dictate this decision? To what extent do these
other reasons factor into the decision process? Do these
reasons change over time? Are these reasons learned
behavior? Are populations making the same change (e.g. from
indemnity to HMO) doing so for the same reasons? What are
the reasons for switching from an indemnity plan to an HMO--
are they based on cost issues and location; are service and
satisfaction reasons to switch from HMO to indemnity; are
doctor preferences and quality the reasons to change from
HMO to HMO?
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Do members of the same family make changes different
from those of the head of the household? Are these
differences within families due to location? If not, what
other factors could be involved? Are their reasons amenable
to change? What services are most utilized by these
switchers? What are the health needs of the switchers?
What is the nature of their expense experience? What is the
nature of their utilization experience?
Specific diagnostic groups should also be analyzed to
determine whether there are differences in utilization of
specific services. For example, diabetics, rheumatoid
arthritics, individuals with infertility concerns, and
pregnancies should all be examined as these groups have
specific utilization needs. The patterns of coverage and
utilization for these individuals might provide a new
understanding on the use and selection of health care within
a multi-option setting.
Also in need of consideration are the administrative
expenses which might be associated with switching. What
costs, if any, should be borne by the switchers? by the
employee pool? Are there policies that might alter this
behavior?
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CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
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This chapter will discuss the research design used to
test the hypotheses discussed earlier. Specific areas that
will be addressed will include Site Requirements (including
site selection and plan characteristics), Data Requirements
and Collection (Employee Information System, Eligibility
System, ClaimFacts System, and telephone survey), Sample
Selection, Analysis, and the presentation of a multivariate
Model.
I. SITE REQUIREMENTS
In order to test the hypotheses discussed above, a
location was needed with specific characteristics. Critical
data (medical claims, employment history, plan and
eligibility information) must have been collected for more
than three years. Due to the unknown nature and size of the
switching populations, it was felt that a large employee
database would provide the highest probability of finding
these events. Along with size, a company that maintained
data on an individual basis was also required. This was the
only way to determine the potential differences which might
arise between dependents and employees (members). Another
major requirement was that the data had to be accessible
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without restriction to the author so that adequate
representations could be made of the population without
additional biases being introduced.
I.A. Site selection
The Director of Medical Education and Research for
Southern California Edison (SCE), Dr. G.W. Courtright, and
the Medical Director (currently Medical Director and
Corporate Vice President), Dr. Jacque J. Sokolov, provided
assurance that SCE could provide support for the majority of
the site requirements which this study put forth. Given the
degree of enthusiasm, support, and data availability,
Southern California Edison was selected as the research
site.
I.B. Characteristics
I.B.1. Site Characteristics
The corporate headquarters of SCE are located in
Rosemead, a small suburb east of downtown Los Angeles,
California. The company is currently the largest utility
company in the United States. There are approximately
19,000 employees, and 38,000 dependents.
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I.B.2. Personnel characteristics
The demographic characteristics of this population can
be seen in figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the next pages.
Figures 2 and 3 show the dependent male and female
populations in the indemnity plan and HMOs respectively.
The scales are the same on these graphs to allow for
comparison. As can be seen, there exists a large portion of
females over the age of 40 in the indemnity plan which does
not exist in the HMOs. Figures 4 and 5 show a similar
depiction except that the older population is comprised
mainly of males.
These depict not only the demographics of SCE, but also
the inequities in age, and risk, between HMOs and the
indemnity plan. It is readily apparent from the graphs that
the average age for individuals within the indemnity plan is
considerably older than in the HMOs.
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FIGURE 2
DEPENDENT POPULATION
Demographic Breakdown of those
Dependents in the Indemnity Plan
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FIGURE 5
MEMBER POPULATION
Demographic Breakdown of those
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NUMBERS OF PEOPLE
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49
AGE CATEGORIES
MALE LFEMALE
Data collected in 1988
---~ ~~ ~  ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
50-59 60 and over
58
MEMBER POPULATION
Demographic Breakdown of those
Members in the Indemnity Plan
NUMBERS OF PEOPLE
40C
35C
300
25C
20C
165
100
5C
0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and o,
AGE CATEGORIES
D MALE FEMALE
Data collected n 1988
__ I_
__ __
ver
I.B.3. Plan Characteristics
The company began offering health care as a benefit in
1902. Health care was provided by a lone physician on
horseback riding from camp to camp in the Sierra mountains.
Since that time, expenditures for health care benefits has
grown from the salary for that physician to almost 25% of
the total benefit package. The increase has prompted
concern as to the future liabilities associated with both
increasing health care benefit levels and increasing costs.
As can be seen in Figure 1 (page 5), the yearly budgets
for the provision of health care at the company have been
growing at a rapid rate. Health care costs for the
organization have been increasing at an annual rate of 23%
(considerably higher than the national average of 15%). The
projections of these rates into the 1990s have caused great
concern at this and many other large corporations.
Figures 6 and 7 depict the penetrations of HMOs into
this market. Figure 6 shows the percent of the total
company population (employees and dependents) with HMO
coverage between the years of 1984 and 1988. Figure 7 shows
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what percentage of this HMO penetration is due to employees
and how much is from the dependents.
FIGURE 6
TOTAL HMO PENETRATION
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FIGURE 8
SCE HEALTH CARE COSTS PER YEAR PER COVERED INDIVIDUAL
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% Change from
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HMO PENETRATION
BY MEMBERSHIP CATEGORY
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In Figure 8, we can see the cumulative four year
increase in health care expenditures for the company's
indemnity plan at 112%, and 67% for the coverage for those
individuals in the HMOs during the study period.
The health care benefits at the company are provided
through the following plans: The Employee Health Care Plan,
The Dependent Health Care Plan, the COBRA (Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985) extended benefits
plan, and a retirement plan. However, the retirement plan
in itself is comprised of various components of the other
plans plus a pilot project called PRIME. The company self-
insures and self-administers its health care benefits.
I.B.2.a. Employee coverage
Within the benefit structure, there exist three
separate entities in the "employee plans." The first group
is full-time employees who have elected health care through
the Employee Health Care Plan. They may receive care from
the providers at the Company Health Care Centers, from
company networked providers, or from providers they choose
themselves (at 80% reimbursement). There is an annual
$150.00 deductible, after which covered health care expenses
of the employees themselves (not their dependents) are paid
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by the company in full. The second group is employees who
have joined any one of the eight HMO choices.12 The last
group comprises employees covered by the extended benefits,
or COBRA. The COBRA portion consists of legislatively
mandated coverage for 18 months for individuals that would
no longer be covered, whether terminated for anything other
than gross misconduct, changing employment status (full-
time->part-time), or if they retired with less than ten
years of service.
I.B.2.b. Dependent coverage
During the study period, there were eight options
available for dependents and part-time employees. Under the
Dependent Health Care Plan, the company pays 80% of the
monthly premium. This plan is open to part-time employees,
dependents of full-time, part-time, or retired employees, or
their surviving spouses. The basic benefits cover 100% of
the reasonable and customary charges up to specified limits.
The major medical benefits are covered at 80% after the
annual deductible of $125 ($250 per family). There is also
an option for dependents to join HMOs. Mandated coverage is
available through COBRA for 36 months when the employee dies
while in service, is involved in a divorce or separation, or
12 General Med., Inland, Pacificare, Kaiser, Maxicare,
Nevada, Ross Loos, and Cigna.
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the dependent loses eligibility (this occurs when unmarried
children reach age 19, unmarried children who are full time
students reach age 23, or if a physical or mental
incapacitation occurs after the age of 19). Dependents are
not currently permitted to use the services provided from
the Company Health Care Centers.
I.B.2.c. Retiree coverage
The retiree plans consist of those retired employees
covered through an extension of the Employee Health Care
Plan, through an HMO, through a company sponsored pilot
project (PRIME), or those covered through the COBRA
mechanism. The employee's premium is paid in full by the
company, as are all bills. Although not currently mandated
legislatively, the company has offered itself to become the
primary payer for Medicare. The loss associated with the
payment of all premiums and the primary payer arrangement
has left some wondering about the viability of these
programs in the future. In the early 1980s, the company
felt that it would recapture approximately 70% of its costs
through a system such as this. Today, this figure has been
estimated at less than 35%.13
13 personal communication with company health care
managers
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I.C. Unique Features
The health care department and benefits structure at
SCE are very unique in a number of ways. Health care
contracts are on an individual basis, rather than on a
subscriber or family level. This allows for a better
representation of dependents and their plan preferences and
utilization data.
Another unique aspect of the benefits plan during the
study period was that there were a number of exogenous
changes in relative costs of plans available to employees.
These cost changes are likely to induce employees to switch
plans (Appendix III and Appendix V).
For example, in 1986, one HMO began to offer coverage
for dependents free of premiums, while the majority of the
others HMOs had premiums significantly lower than the
indemnity plan. The following year, 1987, other HMOs also
began offering dependent care at no additional premium over
and above the company contribution. In 1987, members were
also given the option of paying no additional premium for
certain HMO plans. Prior to this, the indemnity plan was
the only plan which was offered at no additional expense to
the subscriber. For 1988, almost every HMO was free of
premium dollars to the individuals (both members and
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dependents, but not for medicare), but the company sponsored
indemnity plan still had substantial premiums associated
with dependent coverage. These changes increase the
likelihood of switching if consumers are concerned with
minimizing their expenses.
Also of interest during the study period was the
ability for individuals to make health care changes without
changing providers. This was accomplished through the
institution of a preferred provider network that employees
had requested. The effects of this were that almost
everyone was able to have his or her private physician (if
he or she chose to do so) covered through the indemnity
plan. Therefore, people were able to make a transition
without the most important aspect of transition costs--that
of breaking the patient-provider relationship.
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II. DATA REQUIREMENTS AND COLLECTIONS
II.A. Data Elements and Limitations
Data was collected to test the hypotheses presented in
Chapter 3. However, the HMOs which this company offers as
choices were not able to provide adequate data on service
use by individuals, nor were they willing to share reliable
cost or revenue data based upon SCE's population.
Therefore, with only the data from the indemnity plan
available, accurate comparisons of utilization were possible
only during the period when the consumer was in the
indemnity plan. This allowed examination of a switcher's
utilization for the year(s) following disenrollment from an
HMO and the year(s) preceding the enrollment to an HMO.
Due to labor-management conflicts, restrictions were
also placed on information regarding "represented" (union)
employees. Although this restriction was later removed, the
union individuals were excluded from the telephone survey.
However, all other information was gathered for these
individuals.
Further data investigation revealed that while
eligibility and employment data were intact from 1984,
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claims information was not reliable until 1985. Therefore,
while 1984 is included in the determination of the various
"patterns of change", it is excluded from the remainder of
the analysis.
Data sources included the corporation's Employee
Information System, the ClaimFacts system (described below),
corporate accounting books, and management and personnel
interviews.
II.A.1. Employee information
The Employee Information Systems (EIS) provide data
which included sex, age, marital status, family size,
employment status, work location, payroll location, address,
relationship to subscriber, and subscriber category.
II.A.2. Eligibility information
The eligibility files provide data on plan membership
by year, eligibility status, and dates of enrollment.
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II.A.3. Claims information
The ClaimFacts Systems provide the following data:
date of service, inpatient days, place of service, type of
service, provider identification, principal diagnosis,
procedure code, dollar amount charged, dollar amount paid,
and dollar amount allowed. Type of service was then
categorized into claims and dollar amounts for visits with
on-site Edison physicians, visits with outside physicians,
prescription services, inpatient services, surgical
services, obstetrical services, and mental health services.
Expectations for this data are the ability to determine
cost saving and service seeking switches from claims
analysis and to corroborate this information with individual
responses as to their reasons for change. It is expected
that those individuals migrating to the HMOs will have
reduced expenditures possibly with the exception of
obstetrical services. Those individuals disenrolling from
the HMOs are expected to be searching for specific services,
such as mental health, where HMO benefits are limited unlike
those of the indemnity plan.
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II.A.4. Survey Information
II.A.4.a. Survey instrument
While claims data can support the notion of adverse
selection, only the individuals involved can verify whether
changes were intentionally made for cost saving or service
seeking reasons. Consequently, a survey of health care
users that switched plans is used to validate the claims
data. A telephone survey was determined to be the most
effective way to conduct this survey. If a mailed survey
had been used, the open ended questions could not have been
directed to elicit detailed responses which the subjects
provided. The company requested that anonymity be
maintained at all times which removed the possibility of
face-to-face interviews. Further, the logistics required to
attempt a face-to-face interview with this many people would
be impossible given the time constraints.
Due to the nature of certain questions, measures were
taken to design the survey instrument such that individuals
being questioned would not be placed into a defensive
situation. Many consumers are hesitant to discuss medical
needs or emotions to strangers. Therefore, the survey
design required enough general questions in the beginning to
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allow for the respondent to feel comfortable with the
interview and then be lead into more difficult personal
questions. This form of leading also aided respondents to
better clarify their needs by reviewing their history.
The instrument itself was designed in a database format
for ease of use and future analysis. Pertinent history was
uploaded from the master eligibility files to allow the
interviewer the capability to further direct the interview.
The social security number (scrambled) was used as a key
field to further analyze responses with claims information.
The stated history was included to not only verify the
information, but to verify the subject's memory.
After a brief introduction, an additional reminder
about the structure of the interview was given (questions
would be asked about both the respondent's previous plans as
well as the coverage they had in 1988). The survey began
with some very general questions regarding overall
satisfaction levels in their plans (medical, routine,
specialty, emergency, and dependent care). Each of these
areas were then covered in more detail. Questions covered
whether the service was used, the travel time required for
the service, the appointment backlog, in-office waiting
times, out-of-pocket fees, and amount of paperwork which
needed to be completed. These questions were used to assess
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respondent's views on routine care, dependent care, and
emergency services. 14
One question raised in the literature is whether to
evaluate travel times or distances. In many metropolitan
areas, distance is not an adequate representation of the
hassles involved with seeking health care services. Driving
times can provide a much better indicator of convenience.
Two locations the same distance in miles could have
extremely different travel times or convenience levels. 15
II.A.4.a.(1). Outside care
For outside care, questions were asked about the use of
services, whether they were covered, how important those
services were in the health care decision, and service
satisfaction levels.
14 Emergency services did not contain a question about
appointment backlog.
15For example, consider two locations A and B, both 5
miles from a family's house. If location A has highway
access and plenty of parking, the driving time from door to
door could be less than 15 minutes. On the other hand,
location B may access only surface roads and be located
downtown where parking is scarce and very costly. Total
travel time for location B could be close to 1 hour.
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II.A.4.a.(2). Provider issues
Specific provider issues were then addressed. The
subjects were asked whether they had to change health care
providers because of their switch, and whether they were
satisfied with their providers before and after their
change.
II.A.4.a.(3). Service issues
Specific service issues were also addressed with regard
to satisfaction levels with appointment times, information
given over the phone, support staff, facilities, access to
special services, access to hospital care, and access to
emergency care.
II.A.4.a.(4). Health plan selection
Questions were asked to determine who decides health
care arrangements for the family (if not a single
individual) and how such decisions were made. These were
followed by an open discussion about why any changes were
made, why only parts of the family made a change, or why
they were all making different changes.
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Following this discussion, questions were asked to
determine the highest levels of education completed by both
the member and the spouse, whether the family had a dual
income, and the level of that income.
The levels of income selected proved to be inadequate
to assess any differences in total family income. This
geographical phenomenon was not accounted for in the
original design. Almost 92% of the respondents had dual
incomes with total income greater than $50,000. Although
income differences will be noted in the results chapter, it
is not clear which (the total family income or that derived
from the employee in question) might produce an income
effect.
II.A.4.b. Logistics
To set up the telephone interviews, the company sent
letters to individuals asking for their participation in the
study. The company letters and the employee response
letters served multiple purposes. First, they served as a
legal release form from the person. Second, it served to
release additional information such as the person's phone
number, or at least where they might be reached for
participation in the survey and at what time they preferred
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to be called. This was accomplished by adding boxes for the
people to check when they would prefer to be called.
Once the letters were received from survey
participants, their social security numbers had to be
rescrambled to allow compatibility with the database
information. To ensure confidentiality to the respondents,
the company sorted the signed forms so that the appropriate
social security numbers could be assigned. This information
was not released to the author to ensure that plan users who
had been included in the survey but had not responded could
not be identified.
The telephone interviews were complicated by SCE's
phone system, a Rolm digital system, which allows almost all
individuals access to phonemail. Phonemail is a form of
answering machine. While this might be a very functional
system for a work environment, it is not conducive to a
phone survey with very limited time. The conveniences of
these phones went so far as to allow an individual to not be
disturbed during meetings or other busy times. The majority
of the employees included in the survey had access to use
this "Do Not Disturb" facility. This routes all calls
directly to the answering system whether the person is
available or not.
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What began with 208 individuals (38.1% of 546 possible
non-union survey population) who responded by returning
their letters for the telephone survey, was reduced to 62
(29.81% of those responding to the letter) usable
respondents. While not appearing to produce any biases,
this reduction in sample size decreases the statistical
power of the t-tests. However, the company's
confidentiality concerns did create a selection bias since
union employees were excluded. The response letters created
an additional bias. By requiring individuals to actively
participate by returning the release form, a bias was
introduced since only those individuals who had specific
reasons to respond did so. Because of these biases,
generalizations from the survey population to the population
as a whole are severely limited.
The advantage of a phone versus mailed survey was that
open ended questions and discussion were possible. People
were very open to discuss not only the specific questions on
the survey, but would allow specific medical questions to be
asked to which they would gladly respond. While the
response rate was less than expected, given the claims
information to back the data received, the survey was very
informative. The specific reasons and the migration of
those respondents did allow validation of the claims
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information, which did not suffer from biases afflicting the
survey.
II.A.5. Additional Information Sources
II.A.5.a. Employee interviews
These meetings provided information on the various
costs and other data associated with the provision of health
care benefits. SCE self-insures its medical costs.
Information collected included costs associated with
managing an open enrollment (average cost per year during
the study period was $75,000 or about $1.33 per covered
individual per year), and various data on the mechanisms
associated with the management of claims and medical
benefits at such a large corporation.
II.A.5.b. Open enrollment material
This material provided plan descriptions and variations
on an annual basis as well as the costs associated with
each.
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III. SAMPLE SELECTION
Upon determination of whether switching does occur,
various samples were selected for further analysis. The
direction of change, whether from or to an HMO, as well as
whether changes occurred within families were investigated.
III.A. Frequency of Switching
Prior to sample selection, various groups were defined
to stratify each of the sample populations. Health care
switches were defined as changes in plan membership between
1/1/85 and 3/9/88. Non-voluntary changes arising from
initial assignments of coverage, terminations, deaths, non-
eligible employees, or transfers to student status were
excluded. Given these exclusions, the employment and
eligibility data for the remaining population at the firm
(56,354 people) were queried to determine the number of
health care switches individuals had made and the patterns
associated with these switches. The number of changes is
shown in Figure 9.
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FIGURE 9
Number of Individuals* Making Voluntary and Involuntary
Changes in Health Care Coverage in Period 1985 to 1988
Voluntary changes
number
of people
switching
percent
of total
population
Voluntary &
Involuntary Changes
number percent
of people of total
switching population
1 change
2 changes
3 changes
4 changes
5 changes
6 changes
= 18953
= 5987
= 1357
= 342
= 66
= 41
33.6%
10.6%
2.4%
0.6%
0.1%
0.1%
28500
13813
3558
1048
306
253
50.6%
24.5%
6.3%
1.9%
0.5%
0.4%
Total Number Of People
Making Voluntary Switches = 26,746
Total Number of Switching Events = 36,942
includes employees and dependents
Given an average population of 56,354 during three open
enrollment periods and the policy that individuals are only
allowed to change health plans during the annual open
enrollment period (one change per year), there are 169,062
possible switching events, and 36,942 actual changes. This
is 22% of the total and represents the combination of
members and dependents.
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III.A.1. Patterns of Change
In examining this population, it was determined that
there were specific "patterns of change" which the switchers
had made. In order to search for cost saving and service
seeking switches, an annual plan selection code was merged
with the individual's claims data. We have simplified the
basic health care decision to consist of two choices: the
indemnity plan or an HMO. With this scheme, the plan
selection information was coded to "I's" for the choice of
the indemnity plan and "H's" for an HMO. Therefore, if an
individual was in the indemnity plan in 1984, an "I" would
be coded in the first position. If a change was made
outside of the open enrollment period, then the plan in
effect as of January 1 (provided company eligibility was for
more than six months of the year) was used for the code.
This classification procedure was repeated for each of the
subsequent sample years 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988. Those
individuals with less than a five year eligibility were
analyzed separately from those continuously with the company
during the study period. This added an additional level of
variable control.
While there are 32 possible combinations of patterns
(25=32; 2 possibilities "H" (HMO) or "I" (Indemnity) over 5
years--'84,'85,'86,'87,'88), only twenty patterns were
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actually observed. For ease of claims analysis, these were
collapsed. That is, a pattern which presented as HHIIH
produced the collapsed pattern of HIH. The twenty observed
patterns were reduced to seven collapsed patterns (to be
known as "patterns of change"). These patterns of change
consist of the two non-switching patterns "III" for
indemnity and "HHH" for HMOs, and five switching patterns
"HI", "IH", "HIH", "IHI", and "IHIH." No other patterns
were found in this population. Figure 10 represents the
numbers of individuals (from total population) within each
pattern of change and figure 11 shows the percentage
breakdown within each pattern of change for members and
dependents.
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III.A.2. Other comparisons
While the information on the total SCE population
(known as "total" population) was included for determining
overall population statistics, a smaller sample (called
"claims" sample) was selected for claims analysis to
determine whether cost saving or service seeking switches
occur, and a third sample (smaller yet, known as the
"survey" sample) was defined for a telephone survey to
provide additional information about the reasons why people
make health care changes. These samples were compared to a
control group of non-switchers.
The "claims" sample size was dictated by the amount of
claims data which could be analyzed. That is, the ability
to analyze multiple years of claims and eligibility
information was constrained by the availability of computing
time and data storage capacity.
Based upon these constraints, a 30% stratified random
sample of employees was selected, their dependents were then
included (21,253 total comprised of 6000 members, 15253
dependents) and medical claims information was collected.
Stratification was made by pattern of change. Using this
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"claims" population, the company's eligibility information
was then collected, merged and analyzed for this sample.
The survey population was a further reduced stratified,
random sample of the "claims" population. This allowed a
merge of both survey and claims information to support the
reasons for changing health plans. This stratification was
also performed by patterns of change which were observed in
the switching population. Although information on
dependents would be collected, the employee would be source
of information. This sample included 1116 (546 non-union,
570 union) individuals. This figure included a sufficiently
large sample of each pattern of change to allow
determination of statistically significant differences at a
low survey response rate. These figures were considerably
larger than necessary to provide additional statistically
sound (p<.05) comparisons between union and non-union
membership, dependents and members, and interfamily changing
populations.
A comparison between the sample populations can be seen
in Figure 12.
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FIGURE 12
MEAN COMPARISONS BETWEEN SAMPLES
CLAIMS SAMPLE SURVEY SAMPLE
n=21250 n=62
AGE (years)
SEX RATIO (F/M)
FAMILY SIZE
INCOME (dollars)
42.92 (14.99)
1.42 (0.86)
3.16 (1.53)
35,884 (16,464)
40.27 (11.97)
1.06 (0.99)
3.29 (1.51)
37,032 (13,584)
** standard deviations given in parentheses--no
statistically significant differences were noted
While slight differences were seen between the sample
populations, there were no statistically significant
differences. Which is to say, the telephone survey sample
should be a fair representation of the claims sample.
III.A.3. Interfamily changes
SCE permits family members to make different health
care choices from those of the subscriber. With eligibility
information on individuals rather than on only the
subscriber, we found that there were differences in choices
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between family members. The patterns of differences were
then categorized as to whether health care arrangements were
made as a family unit (SAME), whether the dependents went to
an HMO while the member remained in the indemnity plan
(ONE), whether the member changed to an HMO and the
dependents stayed in the indemnity plan (TWO), and whether
during the study period both ONE and TWO occurred (BOTH).
FIGURE 13
Figure 13 shows the number of people associated with
each of these categories. Of the 45,462 individuals shown
in the SAME category, 5,565 are single individuals and could
be excluded from "inter-family" switching. After this
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INTERFAMILY SWITCHES
BY GROUPING
NUMBERS OF PEOPLE (Thousands)
so50
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0
TWOBOTH ONE SAME
PATTERN OF CHANGE
PATTERN OF INTERFAMILY CHANGES
SAME-switch as a unit.
see text
exclusion, 21.4% of all families at SCE had been involved in
this form of switching. This suggests that while the of
families may not be "gaming" the system, a significant
portion is.
III.A.4. Control group
The various switching populations for SCE were compared
to a randomly selected population of non-switchers from the
same firm. The data elements discussed in appendix B were
obtained from the company's claim system, the employment
information system, or company records. Others were
collected through a company coordinated survey, and still
others were collected through anonymous personal interviews.
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IV. ANALYSIS
IV.A. Univariate
The claims and survey data were analyzed using two-
sample difference of means testing (t-tests). This analysis
was implemented via microcomputer based software packages.
IV.B. Multivariate
A probit model was used to evaluate factors which
influence the decision to select an HMO or the company's
indemnity plan. The dependent variable P is classified as
O if the indemnity is chosen and 1 if the HMO plan is
chosen. The selection of one choice will be designated as
"0", the other "1." The probability function of selecting
one choice or the other will be tested in the following
model:
P = BX + U
where P is the plan selection variable, (X) are the
explanatory variables, B is a vector of coefficients and U
is the error term.
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The coefficients will consist of those data elements
previously considered in the univariate analysis (Chapter
IV.II.A or Appendix B for description) with an additional
variable to test the effective of length of service with the
company. By combining this information it is hoped that
additional insight will be gained on the interactions of
each of these variables.
Although this is a very simplistic model, the use of a
model such as this is adds more confirmation to data which
would already support the hypotheses. However, the analysis
described thus far has included only univariate testing,
which is, testing one variable at a time. A probit model
allows multivariate testing of the interactions between
variables. While univariate testing is statistically sound
with the data presented, it is also possible that additional
confounding variables or variables which are highly
correlated with one another may exist and disrupt the true
picture.
V. SUMMARY
What then would our study add to the literature? The
results of this methodology are the culmination of analysis
of individual time series data which consists of not only
health care claims information, but includes a telephone
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survey, data on plan eligibility, and other employee
characteristics (work location, payroll, etc.) to better
understand the factors which underlie the decision to make a
change in health care coverage. The time series data allows
analysis of utilization before and after a change for a
given individual or family or for the company's population
as a whole. The survey allows for the identification of
reasons why people have made health care changes and how
these relate to claims experience. Few studies have had the
luxury of such large databases along with the computing and
analytic power which is available today.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
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We now each of the hypotheses described in Chapter 3.
First to be considered will be the frequency of switching,
followed by the reasons for switching (cost saving and
service seeking). A short summary will be given at the end
of each section to suggest whether the hypothesis would be
accepted or rejected.
I. UNIVARIATE
I.A. Frequency of Switching
I.A.1. Total population
The following research question was posed:
Are changes in health care coverage rare or common?
Switching does appear to occur at this company. Health
care switches were defined as changes in plan membership
between 1/1/85 and 3/9/88. Data selection for the 3 year
period, indicates that 13.84% (7793 individuals) of the
firm's eligible workers are involved in regular health care
changes (2 or more in the 3 year study period)and 47%
changed at least once. The graphic depiction of the number
of individuals corresponding to the numbers of switches they
made during the study period can be seen in figure 14.
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FIGURE 14
As can be seen in the previous chart, some individuals
made more changes than were theoretically possible. This is
not a data error. These individuals (1806) with more than 3
switches during the study period were permitted to alter
their health care arrangements beyond that which was
normally allowed. This was accomplished through specific
complaint or for some, simply stating they did not realize
what plan they had chosen. While some level of error will
certainly occur from the company's side of this selection
process, some surveyed individuals stated specifically
"...we were unhappy with the way they (an HMO) treated us,
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so we changed back (to the indemnity plan, their previous
choice)."
From this data, we can conclude that in this
population, switching does occur with relatively high
frequency.
When the population is considered as a whole (i.e.
people who started in an indemnity plan and people who
started in an HMO all together), 22.42% made at least one
health care change during the study period. Of those who
changed types of coverage once, 7.79% (1.75% of the total
population) changed back to their original form of coverage.
Of those who returned, another 7.12% (0.12% of the total
population) switched again.
However, when the events are separated between
individuals who began in an HMO and those who began in the
indemnity plan, a different story emerges. For those who
began in the indemnity plan, the percentages are very
similar to the total population: 23.24% changed from the
indemnity to an HMO, 6.26% of those making this first switch
changed back to the indemnity plan, and 9.45% of this second
group switched back to an HMO again. On the other hand, the
group that began in the HMO lost only 14.63% and of that
group, 30.79% returned.
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These findings suggest that while the first change has
a substantial probability of occurring (22.42%), the
probability of additional changes appears to decrease to
approximately 7% each occurrence. For the HMO population,
the initial change appears to be much lower (14.63%) and the
rate at which people return is much higher (30.79%).
I.A.2. By age group
To approach this category, the company's demographic
information was queried and projections made. We can see
from the demographic charts in Chapter IV that a large
portion of SCE's population will be entering retirement
years within the next two decades. As can be seen from
figure 15 on return percentages, the older age groups have a
much higher return rate to the indemnity plan prior to and
during retirement. Given what we know about health care
expenditures in the last years of life, this leaves the
company sponsored indemnity plan with the older, hence more
costly population.
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FIGURE 15
RETURNS TO INDEMNITY
AGE GROUP
0-5
6-18
19-25
26-32
33-40
41-55
56-64
65 +
data is an
PERCENT WITHIN EACH AGE GROUP
RETURNING TO THE INDEMNITY PLAN
annual percent
4.44
6.44
6.77
8.24
9.78
9.82
19.09
22.61
per age category
This chart holds some concerns for most companies with
ever increasing HMO penetration into their corporate
populations. The younger (probably healthier) population
tends to remain with the HMO, while as the population ages,
possibly due to the increased mobility due to retirement and
quest for services outside the normal service area for most
HMOs they return to the company's rich indemnity insurance.
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Another reason for the older populations migrating back
to the indemnity plan is the financial incentives currently
in place. Because the company has taken the responsibility
of the part B payor for Medicare, and because the cost
differential between the indemnity plan and the available
HMOs is so great, elderly individuals will continue to
return to the indemnity plan.
I.A.3. By year by membership
Findings at SCE suggest that the persistence rate per
year is approximately 98.5%. This number was obtained by
backing out the compound percentage which would leave 92% of
the original population. Figures 16, 17, and 18 depict the
percent of employees, total population (employees and
dependents), and those of the dependents respectively. If
one looks only at the employee disenrollee percentages, it
is apparent that employees are not making drastic switches
in their health care arrangements. If dependents are
included (therefore the total population), this finding
drops to 94.8% on average. However, when dependents are
considered on their own, the per year persistence rate
declines to 92.2%.
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While these numbers suggest that small percentages of
people actually change, further scrutiny revealed that when
these results are looked at over time, the results are not
as insignificant. In fact, the figures (16, 17, and 18)
show the compounding effects.
FIGURE 16
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FIGURE 17
FIGURE 18
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I.B. Reasons for Switching
Reasons for switching were separated into those defined
as cost saving and those defined as service seeking. The
claims population was examined first followed by the
examination of the survey population.
I.B.1. Claims Results
I.B.l.a. Cost saving
Those expenses which could be directly attributable to
out-of-pocket expenses were examined. The first hypothesis
to test the existence of cost-saving switches was:
H1: The incidence of switching is affected by
changes in premiums. In particular, as
premiums increase, switching away from the
increase would be expected.
When the members and dependents are separated, relative
cost data and migration patterns can be seen in figures 19,
20, 21, and 22 (seen on the next two pages). Figures 19 and
21 depict the costs for each year for dependents and members
respectively. Costs shown are the average monthly HMO
premium, and the monthly indemnity plan premium. In this
way, the costs can be compared while looking at
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FIGURE 19
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FIGURE 21
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figures 20 (22) which show the numbers of dependents
(members) migrating to the HMOs.
For dependents, 1986 was the first year in which there
was either no additional premium charge or that the cost
difference between the HMOs and the indemnity plan became
negligible. As seen in figure 12, the increase in absolute
numbers of disenrollees from the indemnity plan appears to
coincide with the drop in costs for the HMO options.
Migrations to HMOs increase with the relative decrease in
HMO pricing.
For members, 1987 was the first year in which the HMOs
were offered at no additional premium, that is, HMOs were
the same price as the indemnity plan. Although the numbers
of member switchers are small in relative terms (4.64% of
the member population), this represents a 233% increase in
the number of members who switched in the previous open
enrollment period.
From the pricing information, a pattern of rational
purchasing appears. Although the employee population does
not show as drastic a migration shift as the dependents, a
shift in both populations does occur and coincides with a
decrease in the relative premiums being paid.
103
From these figures we can comfortably accept the
hypothesis concerning the impact of premium differences on
switching behavior.
Other hypotheses which tested the existence of cost-
saving switches are:
H2: The copayment amounts are different between
those who switch and those who don't.
and
H3: The deductible amounts are different between
those who switch and those who don't.
The copayment and deductible amounts are reported in
figure 23. Here, the figures are separated based upon
switching direction (I->H is indemnity to HMO, I->I is no
switch (the controls), and H->I is HMO to indemnity). That
is, those individuals going to an HMO would no longer pay
these amounts whereas their counterparts switching from the
HMO to the indemnity plan would.
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FIGURE 23
AVERAGE DOLLAR AMOUNTS SPENT PER
DIRECTION OF CHANGE:
I->H I->I H->I
(n=12326) (n=5740) (n=1566)
DEDUCTIBLE $61.03 $71.20 $92.70
(52.46) (60.63) (63.97)
COPAYMENT $58.26 $86.71 $135.67**
(112.92) (236.35) (265.30)
statistically different than I->I at p < .05.
standard deviations are given in parentheses
Although these figures allow us to reject the null
hypotheses about non-difference, it says little as to why.
While we can speculate that those individuals going to HMOs
had lower deductibles and lower copayments because of better
health, we might also speculate that those individuals
returning to the indemnity plan did so for specific
services, and hence, their copayment amounts and deductibles
were higher. Examination of total charges may enlighten
this theory of better health. If the assumption is made
that individuals who require lower expenditures are
105
healthier, then total dollar expenditures should provide a
fair representation of health.
To determine this, claims data was analyzed and
compared to the control group of non-switchers (I->I).
Figure 24 on total charge per direction of change suggests
varying levels of charges.
FIGURE 24
AVERAGE HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE CHARGED
BY THE SWITCHING POPULATION
SWITCHING MEAN AMOUNT OF
PATTERN DOLLARS CHARGED
I->H $967.72** (1209)
I->I $1672.79 (1733)
H->I $2088.61 (2409)
**
statistically significant difference from I->I at p<.05
Individuals in the I->H category have lower dollar
amounts when compared to the other groups for these charts.
However, those returning to the indemnity plan from the HMO
use considerably more of the health care dollar than their
non-switching counterparts. This information was further
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supported during the interview and survey process when
respondents made suggestions such as: "We switched because
we just didn't need the additional coverage."
The data suggests that while the average switcher that
chose the indemnity plan had significantly higher
expenditures compared to their non-switching and HMO
switching counterparts, data was not available to permit
evaluation of whether the average switcher increased or
decreased his copayment or deductible dollar expenditures.
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I.B.l.b. Service seeking switches
As there are many services which were considered, those
which could be most representative of health care costs were
examined. The hypotheses for those services were:
H1: There are differences in dollar amounts charged
or number of claims used for Y service between
groups that switch and those that don't.
where Y is each of the following respectively: obstetrical
(OB), mental health (MH), pharmacy (PH), inpatient (INPT),
surgical (SURG), outside physician use(OMD), and inside
physician use(SCEDOC).
Figure 25 shows the differences in the average number
of claims between the two switching patterns for each of the
services tested. This chart contains data that was
standardized by including only those individuals who had
company eligibility for the entire study period. The chart
is then followed by a representation of the average dollar
amount charged per group in figure 26.
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FIGURE 25
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CLAIMS PER
DIRECTION OF CHANGE:
I->H I->I
SERVICE:
SCE PHYSICIAN
OUTSIDE MD
INPATIENT
SURGICAL
PHARMACY
OBSTETRICAL
MENTAL HEALTH
0.68
4.00
0.11
0.39
**
1.78
0.32
0.44
2.00
6.71
0.12
0.68
3.86
0.19
1.11
statistically different than I->I at p < .05
as determined by difference of means testing.
Claims--per year of indemnity eligibility during
the study period.
FIGURE 26
MEAN DOLLAR AMOUNT CHARGED PER
DIRECTION OF CHANGE:
I->H I->I H->I
SERVICE:
SCE PHYSICIAN
OUTSIDE MD
INPATIENT
SURGICAL
PRESCRIPTIVE
OBSTETRICAL
MENTAL HEALTH
10.87
146.58
93.02
122.18
28.81
82.26
80.48
37.26
281.12
129.40
184.95
80.10
46.45
184.13
33.45
402.92
121.39
239.28
55.96
82.20
407.35
statistically different than I->I at p < .05.
as determined by difference of means testing.
Dollars--per year of indemnity eligibility during
the study period.
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H->I
**
1.75
8.21
0.14
0.73
2.68
0.33
2.06
**
I.B.l.b.(1). SCE physician use
In figure 25, SCE PHYSICIAN represents the mean dollars
spent per individual for "in-house" physician services as
well as the number of claims associated with these
providers. This data reflects only charges and claims made
by members as no dependent care is provided at SCE. When
this data is considered on a dollar per claim basis, the
results show another pattern. Those individuals going to
the HMO have an average cost per claim of $15.98. Those
remaining in the indemnity plan average $18.63 while the
individuals migrating into the indemnity plan require an
average of $19.11.
The predictions for this utilization statistic were as
expected. Those individuals switching to an HMO did have
reduced claims and expenditures than did their non-switching
and HMO disenrollee counterparts.
I.B.l.b.(2). Outside physician use
The average cost per claim was $36.65, $41.90, and
$49.08 for I->H, I->I, H->I respectively. Here we see that
not only are those individuals migrating into the indemnity
plan from the HMO spending more on the use of physician
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services outside of SCE, but that the cost per claim is
considerably higher as well.
The expectations for this category were mixed.
Although the group of individuals switching to HMOs were
thought to be healthier and therefore require fewer services
overall, it was thought that their use of outside physician
services might be either the same or greater than their
counterparts. The results show that for outside physician
services, the individuals switching to the HMOs have lower
expenditures and reduced frequency compared to the other
groups.
I.B.l.b.(3). Pharmacy use
The mean dollars per claim are $16.19, $20.75, and
$20.88 for the patterns respectively. Prescription claims,
dollars, and mean dollars per claim have been suggested to
infer the health status of a population. The more sick the
population, the higher the per claim cost for prescriptions.
With this in mind, one can see that the per claim cost for
those migrating to the HMO is also considerably lower than
the other groups. These findings were consistent with the
previous expectations.
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I.B.l.b.(4). Inpatient services
The per claim expense for inpatient services was
$845.64, $1078.33, and $867.07 for I->H, I->I, and H->I
respectively. The only difference is that of reduced
expenses for those migrating to the HMO. However, this
information needs to be put into context with the following
explanation for surgical services.
I.B.1.b.(5). Surgical services
The per claim expense was $313.28, $271.99, and $327.78
for I->H, I->I, and H->I respectively. While it can be seen
that the individuals returning to the indemnity plan spend
considerably more health care dollars for surgical care than
their counterparts, we should consider the information also
collected for inpatient costs. Although the surgical costs
are higher for those individuals disenrolling from an HMO,
their inpatient costs tend to be lower. One possible
explanation is that the surgeries could well have been
"elective." Given that most elective procedures have
shorter lengths of stay than non-elective procedures, it
would follow that the inpatient costs for these patients
would also be lower.
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Expectations for both surgical and inpatient services
were correct for the most part. However, while surgical
expenses were higher for those individuals switching to the
indemnity plan, the number of claims were not significantly
different from the control group.
I.B.1.b.(6). Obstetric services
While expectations were met for the group switching to
the HMOs, the finding of such high obstetric figures for
both switching and non-switching group)(relative to the
control group) was not expected. A reason for this can be
explained by examining the group patterns rather than only
the direction of change.
The group patterns show interesting findings. Those
transferring from H->I->H use the significantly more
obstetric dollars than any of the other group patterns (see
Figure 19). This also was confirmed through the survey as
individuals in the group made statements such as "...we
wanted to have our baby in a different hospital than the HMO
allowed, so we came back to the Edison plan (indemnity) for
the choice. After the baby was born, they (wife and child)
went back to Maxicare...the child care (well-baby care) is
considerably cheaper (less expensive) than at Edison."
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I.B.l.b.(7). Mental health services
The per claim costs were $182.91, $165.88, and $197.74
for I->H, I->I, and H->I respectively. Mental health care
is the second highest expenditure, second only to inpatient
hospital services, for many companies today. It is
interesting then to find that when one looks at those
individuals making health care changes, we find such a large
average dollar figure for HMO disenrollees.
If the dollar amounts used by group pattern HI are
extrapolated for the number of individuals who fall within
this group, this 0.9% of the total population account for
almost 21% of the mental health expenditures.
The majority of individuals switching to an HMO had
statistically lower expenses and claims when compared to
either the non-switching control group (I->I) or the other
switching group who changed to the indemnity plan.
Inferences can be made from the claims data. In particular,
service seeking switches were examined in which the
utilization statistics of particular groups were
significantly different from that of the control population.
Mental health, a benefit long controlled at most HMOs, would
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be one example of a service seeking switch. Well baby care
would be another.
Figures 27 and 28 show the average dollars for
obstetrical services and mental health per "pattern of
change." As seen in the figure 25 and 26, these services
have very significant findings. 16 It is interesting to note
however, that the obstetrical amounts are almost identical
in both the switching population from the HMO and the
switching population to the HMO. Therefore, it is not
surprising when we look at figure 27 to see that the pattern
HIH is as high as it is. This suggests that many women
having babies disenroll from the HMO to the indemnity plan
to have their baby in the hospital of choice or with their
physician of choice, rather than to have the restrictions
which are generally placed by HMOs. However, after having
the child, it appears that many of these women then return
to the HMO for the well baby services which the HMOs provide
full coverage for.
16 Although Figures 18 and 19 also include individuals
with less than full eligibility, the relative figures are
comparable.
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FIGURE 27
FIGURE 28
116
OBSTETRIC CHARGES
BY SWITCHING PATTERN
DOLLARS
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
H->l H->I-,H I->H I-H->I ,I
PATTERN OF CHANGE
Average dollars spent per individual
during the study period. Recorded
while in the indemnity plan.
MENTAL HEALTH CHARGES
BY SWITCHING PATTERN
DOLLARS
I-IH-,l H-,I-,H IH ->H- I
PATTERN OF CHANGE
Average dollarsa pent per individual
during the study period. Recorded
while in the indemnity plan.
_I
_ __
Therefore, cost saving and service seeking switches
were found to occur. Figures 19 through 22 above suggest
that the relative cost of the HMOs to the indemnity plan is
highly correlated with a cost-saving rationale for
switching. Figures 23 through 28 provide support for
service seeking and cost saving switches. The data supports
the hypothesis of rational buying of health care by
supporting its hypotheses. These hypotheses have shown that
switching does occur, and that cost saving and service
seeking switches can be readily found.
I.B.l.c. Diagnostic switches
Specific diagnostic groups were also analyzed to
determine whether there are differences in utilization of
specific services between various switching populations.
Diabetics, and rheumatoid arthritics tended to stay in the
indemnity plan. For the claim retrieval of these
individuals with diagnostic coding associated with these
disorders, all remained within the indemnity plan (pattern
code III) during the study period. This is as Luft and
others have suggested in that people with specific medical
concerns are more likely to have a personal physician. The
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transition costs associated with this type of switch would
be considerable. Another possibility is that within this
population of diabetics and rheumatoid arthritics, the
majority are also on Medicare. Therefore with the financial
incentives for people to return to the company sponsored
indemnity plan for their Medicare coverage, individuals have
great incentives to stay where they are.
Individuals with infertility concerns tended to migrate
to HMOs. Often this migration was made because of the depth
of coverage in the HMO. However, the reasons were not
always economic. Concerns about the possible lack of
confidentiality within the organization were also mentioned
as reasons not to obtain services within the company's
system. Individuals who became pregnant had the greatest
representation in the population migrating from HMO->ind-
>HMO.
I.B.2. Survey
In addition to the claims data, the survey results
provide support for the hypotheses of cost saving and
service seeking switching. Prior research suggests that
most changes occur because of dissatisfaction with the
medical care received (see Sorenson and Wersinger(1981)).
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However, the following is a list in order of preference of
the "top five" reasons which the 62 respondents to this
study's telephone survey provided:
1. cost (based mainly on premiums and out-of-pocket
expenses although some respondents replied
that they had considered the cost and
additional services which they
required.(n=46))
2. dependent care (n=28)
3. convenience (n=20)
4. dissatisfaction (n=17)
5. service-specific requirements (n=12)
These reasons varied systematically across respondent
types. Individuals making switches from the indemnity plan
to the HMOs generally did so because of cost, with dependent
care and convenience following. Those making changes from
one HMO to another suggested that the main reasons were for
costs and additional physician choice. Individuals
switching from the HMOs to the indemnity plan mentioned
physician choice, service availability, no forms or
paperwork, and convenience due to location. Unfortunately,
due to the poor telephone response and potential biases
which were introduced, it is not clear how generalizable
these results are.
The reasons most frequently given by pattern of change
are shown in Figure 29. As some individuals had made more
than one type of change, their reasons for each switch were
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recorded.
FIGURE 29
SWITCHING REASONS FOR CHANGE
PATTERN
I->H cost(n=42),
service needs(dependent care)(n=24),
location(convenience) (n=14).
H->H cost(n=4),
choice of physician(n=3),
convenience(n=3).
H->I specific service need(Mental Health, OB)(n=12),
choice of physician(n=4).
Reasons for the migrations were as expected. Because
the cost of well baby care is a covered expense in HMOs and
not in the indemnity plan, reasons followed intuition.
Those interviewed who required well baby services (n=16)
stated that cost was the major factor in their switch from
the indemnity plan to the HMO for well baby care. However,
the majority of those interviewed (81.25%--13/16) were first
time parents. This bias may well interfere with the
results. The switching behavior for these people might be
easily explained by Luft's "lack of integration" theory
(1987).17 With no definitive care-giver associations for
17This theory suggests that individuals without regular
health care providers have much lower transition costs and
therefore, due to "lack of integration" into the system, may
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the unborn child, the transition costs would be reduced, and
the premium differential often dictates the decision. For
many HMOs, well baby care is a low cost service which
attracts young healthy individuals.
Mental health, on the other hand, is not a low cost
service. For SCE, mental health is the second largest
expenditure in corporate health care. Often, the care which
is given for these individuals itself creates a strong
physician-patient relationship thereby increasing transition
costs. As many restrictions apply for these services in the
HMO environments, people seeking the service at less cost to
themselves often switch to the indemnity plan for its wealth
of coverage. Only two of the survey respondents required
mental health services and both stated that their return to
the indemnity plan was because they had used their available
benefits through the HMOs. Figure 28 depicts the
differences between patterns of change that suggest adverse
selection.
Although differences in satisfaction are found in the
literature, only those individuals in group pattern HI
showed a statistically significant difference from their
counterparts. However, though their levels of satisfaction
change their health care arrangement.
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with their previous plan was reduced compared to the other
groups, these individuals were generally satisfied with
their previous plan (figure 30).
FIGURE 30
OVERALL SATISFACTION LEVELS
WITH PREVIOUS PLAN
SWITCHING OVERALL
PATTERN MEAN
I->H 3.72 (2.74)
I->I 3.87 (1.98)
**
H->I 3.12 (1.1)
statistically different than I->I at p < .05.
This chart suggests that while all individuals are
fairly satisfied with the health care they have received,
those making switches from the HMO back to the indemnity
plan are less satisfied than their counterparts making the
change to the HMO.
Figures 31 and 32 also each show a finding which is
statistically different. For routine services, those
individuals leaving the HMO were less likely to be satisfied
than their counterparts. Dependent care also showed a
difference which was statistically relevant. Although all
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showed a statistically significant difference from their
counterparts. However, though their levels of satisfaction
with their previous plan was reduced compared to the other
groups, these individuals were generally satisfied with
their previous plan (figure 30).
FIGURE 30
OVERALL SATISFACTION LEVELS
WITH PREVIOUS PLAN
SWITCHING OVERALL
PATTERN MEAN
I->H 3.72 (2.74)
I->I 3.87 (1.98)
** H->I 3.12 (1.1)statistically different than I->I at p < .05.
This chart suggests that while all individuals are
fairly satisfied with the health care they have received,
those making switches from the HMO back to the indemnity
plan are less satisfied than their counterparts making the
change to the HMO.
Figures 31 and 32 also each show a finding which is
statistically different. For routine services, those
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individuals leaving the HMO were less likely to be satisfied
than their counterparts. Dependent care also showed a
difference which was statistically relevant. Although all
of these figures appear to show generalized satisfaction,
the individuals leaving the indemnity plan tended to have a
lower thought of the services they received.
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FIGURE 31
OVERALL SATISFACTION LEVELS
WITH ROUTINE SERVICE
FROM PREVIOUS PLAN
SWITCHING
PATTERN
I->H
I->I
H->I
ROUTINE SERVICE
MEAN
3.91
4.29
3.61
**
statistically different than I->I at p < .05.
FIGURE 32
OVERALL SATISFACTION LEVELS
WITH DEPENDENT CARE
FROM PREVIOUS PLAN
SWITCHING
PATTERN
I->H
I->I
H->I
DEPENDENT CARE
MEAN
3.16
3.64
3.25
statistically different than I->I at p < .05.
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**
These charts give some additional insights as to the
important factors for the switching population. That is, as
the respondents to the open ended questions stated, and as
their claims and eligibility information infers, those
individuals making the change to the indemnity plan were
less satisfied with their routine care and hence, switched
to a plan in which they had more control.
No other statistically significant results were found
through the survey. The low response rate reduced the
ability to determine any further differences based upon the
requirements set forth in the research design.
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II. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
The probability distribution function model described
earlier was tested on the data available from years 1985
through 1988 on company employees and their dependents
included in the "claims" population. The model was tested
twice. The first test (P1) compared the claims history for
those individuals making the selection to a HMO versus those
who remained in the indemnity plan. The second test (P2)
examined the claims differences between those individuals
disenrolling from an HMO and selecting the indemnity plan
with their counterparts who remained in the indemnity plan.
P1 (Figure 33) and P2 (Figure 34) show the coefficients from
these models. T-statistics are shown in parentheses.
Variable definitions can be found in the methodology chapter
and in the appendix.
These models also confer that those individuals who
self-select tend to be dependents and younger when compared
to those who remain in the indemnity plan. Model P1
provides additional support to the univariate testing for
family size and utilization variables of SCE clinic usage
and prescription usage. Model P2 provides additional
verification of the mental health results. The remaining
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variables were found to be not statistically significant at
P<. 05.
FIGURE 33
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Probit Estimates
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FIGURE 34
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III. LIMITATIONS
However, data from the HMOs were not available and
therefore little can be said about those individuals
switching between HMOs. The only available information is
shown in appendix C. Although this suggests considerable
differences between these HMOs and the indemnity plan, the
collection methods, sources and standard deviations are not
known. While inferences can be made, whether these numbers
are statistically different is unknown.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
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I. Findings
This study has shown that there are many people who are
indeed, shopping for health care. Dependents do so more
frequently than members, and females more than males. While
a cross-sectional study may show that these effects are
small, when the effects are analyzed over time, another
story emerges.
People at the location studied do self-select their
health care based upon expected costs and service needs.
This has been shown through the use of claims data,
eligibility information, and personal interviews.
The literature suggests that people do not change their
health care arrangements (Neipp and Zeckhauser 1985). The
findings presented here both support and enlighten this
theory. That is, if only members (the employees only) are
considered (or possibly in settings where the member-
dependent must move as a unit), the findings at SCE suggest
that the persistence rate per year is approximately 98.5%.
However, if dependents are included, this finding drops to
94.8% on average, and when dependents are considered
separately, the per year persistence rate declines to 92.2%.
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These figures still suggest that the majority of the
population does not migrate on a yearly basis. However, it
should be clarified that if the effects are considered over
the length of the study period (4 open enrollment periods),
the persistence rates show 92.94% of the members as
persisters but only 66.65% of the dependents remaining with
their original plan.
The hypotheses presented were tested by attempting to
answer specific research questions. For the original
hypothesis regarding the rational purchase of health care,
the initial question was to determine whether or not
switching occurs. The appearance of switching then
progressed such that data were analyzed for switching
occurrences relative to premium differences, copayment
reductions, and service requirements. These were defined as
cost-saving and service-seeking switches.
Both cost-saving and service-seeking switches were
found for the switching population, supporting the
hypothesis of rational buying of health care. However, the
telephone survey aided in obtaining the information
necessary to clarify this behavior. Where rational reasons
were not obvious from the claims or other data sets, the
telephone survey provided additional insight. This was made
more clear when it was determined that these individuals
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were seeking specialty care and paying out-of-pocket for
these services. These services would eventually lead to
expensive surgical procedures which would be covered in the
indemnity plan.
II. Consequences
Although HMOs are increasingly penetrating corporate
populations, the cost savings which have been shown are not
being passed on to the corporations themselves. One
possible explanation for this is that people self-select
their health care. When this behavior is combined with an
inappropriate rating scheme and misinformation, or imperfect
information, companies will not receive the potential
revenues. The data collected in this study support the
hypothesis.
Switching is impacting the company. The impact is
being seen in increasing costs, increasing manpower, and
increasing benefits to maintain the satisfaction levels of
the consumers. Unfortunately, this is occurring while the
indemnity plan declines and the HMOs attract more of the
younger, healthier population.
In the location selected, the maximum company
reimbursement to the HMOs is based on the indemnity plan's
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rate. As the indemnity plan's rate increases to cover the
costs associated with the care of its considerably older
population, to say nothing of the population which is gaming
its services, then the HMOs will continue to enjoy
increasing premiums. The incentive to pass any major cost
savings on to the company have been removed. As long as the
HMO's premium is less than that of the indemnity plan,
individuals do not have a monthly premium. If however the
HMO premium exceeds the employer's contribution, the
additional monies are the responsibility of the subscriber.
As can be seen, many people are price sensitive and the
increase (or relative decrease) in required premiums or out-
of-pocket expenses induces changes in coverage. Therefore,
if the HMO's decrease their premiums to a level below that
of the indemnity plan, an increase in disenrollment from the
indemnity is likely to occur.
Adverse selection is occurring at the location studied.
Not only is this based upon claims information, but, at the
site selected, the potential for a much higher risk
population exists long-term. The return percentages to the
indemnity plan after the fifth decade of life raises a
significant burden on the company for the provision of
health care for their population.
134
With ever increasing health care costs, and the burden
of adverse selection, companies will continue to experience
increasing costs. The positive feedback loops in this
system currently are unchecked. Company rates increase to
cover the costs of their population; the rates that the
company pays to the HMO are tied to the rates that the
indemnity plan pays with no reference to HMO costs; younger,
healthier, less costly contracts migrate to the HMOs
removing the ability for cost-shifting; the cost per
contract at the company increases further because the less
expensive contracts have left; the cycle starts again.
III. Mechanisms for change
The pricing structure and incentives (in effect 1988)
seen at the location studied will not reduce the adverse
selection which has been shown in this study. However, the
location has invested the time, capital, and manpower to
provide a first rate health care department for what is soon
to be the nation's largest utility company. Because of this
investment, the large amount of fixed costs would suggest
that any means to bring more premium dollars back to the
organization should be a benefit. Given the dynamics of
this organization, one of the only ways for this to occur
would be if those physicians already in place had additional
capacity, if more capacity was produced (hiring more health
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care providers) or if external costs could be controlled.
Since none of these will remove the underlying problem of
adverse selection and community rating, benefit
modifications may be the only means by which to reduce the
adverse selection which we are seeing.
Another impact that might be seen which has the
potential for cost inflation is that of the company trying
to return the "lost sheep" to the fold. This could be
performed in a variety of mechanisms. One way to induce the
return might be a reduction in the price relative to that
seen in the HMO's. If the hypotheses given here are true,
then a drop in price alone might be enough to induce a
sizable return. The reverse could also hold. That is, if
the price of the HMO's rises relative to the company
programs, the same should hold. Another option is to add an
incentive program to the health care package already in
place. This could be seen in the form of flexible health
plans and monetary-based preventive health plans. But here
again, we should consider the costs associated with the
start-up phenomenon and the potentials of adverse selection.
Implications for policy would include investigating the
possible restructuring of payment rating mechanisms, benefit
structures, the lack of cost associated with switching,
additional risk sharing schemes--including corporate
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ownership of HMOs which serve the employees and compete
against the company's self-insured indemnity plan.
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Suggestions for future research include the
determination of case mix and how rational buying might
affect this over time. It is unclear how long the cycle of
adverse selection could occur and still leave a viable
insurance product.
We do not know how cost-effective various benefit
modifications are or whether or not specific policies can
reduce or alter the switching behavior. Flexible benefit
programs, "Good Health Rebates," and preventive health
accounts all have the potential to begin the reversal of
adverse selection. Whether the community rating schemes
currently in place will be replaced by a variable payment
mechanism and how effective this may be in deterring self-
selection is unknown.
Of medical importance would be the tracking of
individuals with specific medical conditions through various
programs to determine what effects the change in care givers
provides. Due to the paternalistic nature of many
corporations today, we might expect that there are strong
incentives to maintain a healthy low cost population. There
may be a greater incentive to test the feasibility of a
standardized medical record in a media other than the
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present paper chart in order to better track medical
information.
Mental health costs seen in this study deserve
additional research. It is not clear whether these
differences might be geographically related or what the
potential effects may be. Benefit modifications are
currently planned which should place the indemnity plan at
the same risk as HMOs. Whether this will change switching
behavior for those requiring these services is unknown.
We also need to determine whether the number of years
of exposure to the potential for change has an effect on the
probability for change and direction.
With regard to additional categories of individuals who
deserve mention are single parent families. It is not known
how these individuals go about selecting health care. Given
the dramatic increase in numbers of people in this category,
new benefits plans may require modification to address
additional needs.
Standardization and increasing data sharing needs to be
addressed. Current management reports in the literature as
well as in many companies, are inadequate. The reports
often are not standardized in any way. However, comparisons
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and policies continue to be made without a real
understanding of the materials.
Because of the selection biases that were raised in the
survey of this study, another attempt at placing the
instrument should be made to more accurately determine
differences in reasons for switching between various
populations.
The location selected has undergone considerable change
since the study was conceived and conducted. Many of the
areas for future research could be addressed at the same
location. Many items that were of concern in the past are
in the process of being rectified (HMO data availability,
and indemnity data analysis). Given the levels of support
and enthusiasm, it would be highly recommended that this
company continue to provide research assistance in this
field.
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DATA ELEMENTS
(this list is not all-inclusive and should have the capacity to
relate trends, forecasts, and outside variables as well)
DEMOGRAPHICS (company, region, dept, plan, etc)
patient sex
patient age
marital status
family status
education level ***
employment
income
OTHERS
subscriber/patient relationship
patient/provider relationship
subscriber category
major benefit category
plan type
location/area code
industrial code
rating code/method
ORGANIZATION VARIABLES
*COSTS and/or associated REVENUES*
TOTAL AND PER PLAN
per demographic category
per member
per contract
per covered individual
per claim
claims paid amount
capitated amount
copayment
deductible
administrative expense ***
commission expenses
CLAIMS DATA .
date incurred
claim receipt date
paid date
discharge date
days/visits/treatments
claim types (paymt, prepay, capit)
place (inpt, outpt, amb ctr, MD off)
provider identifier
service identifier (med, sur, lab, pharm, etc)
group numbers
patient identifier
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renewal date
plan rating code
discharge summary/diagnosis
*MANAGEMENT*
benefits
# of plans offered
# of personnel assigned
# of subscribers/plan
tracking mechanisms associated with plan utilization
audit trails
automated systems, to what extent?
use of:
utilization review
admission precertification
case management
concurrent hospital review
mandated outpatient care
employee & retiree education programs
"gatekeeper" substance abuse programs
ancillary services
community vs actuarial rated HMO's
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
*COSTS*
cost per plan
costs per service
outside utilization costs ***
switching costs, if any
copayment (event, time period, prescription, etc)
deductible
headache costs (out of plan paperwork, notification, etc)
nuisance fees
length of coverage
previous coverage, length, and reasons for switching
UTILIZATION
total numbers
outside utilization ***
per plan
per covered individual
per contract
per repeat utilization
per service
per event
out of plan use
ability to track given individuals over time? length?
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HEALTH STATUS
medisgroups data?
specific categories (smokers, diabetics, cad, etc)
*** those items reports not readily available w/in system.
In addition to the above variables, questions relating to
both the control and switching population should include the
following items. These should also include data for both the
previous and current options:
satisfaction
previous hassles/claims
availability of appointment times
availability of necessary services
satisfaction with providers
satisfaction with facility
satisfaction with other staff
location differences
provider differences
knowledge of plan (coverage)
where did you find out
how
when
knowledge of plan services
where
how
when
cost differential
between plans (premium, copay, deductible, etc.)
specific free services
specific lower cost services
special requirements--fertility, etc.
loyalty factors
peer pressure
market pressure
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The explanatory variables are as follows:
premium--this is the premium for the selected plan
expected out-of-pocket costs
"cpy"--copayment
"ded"--deductible
"age"--age in years
"stl" status--member(O) or dependent(l)
relation--to subscriber (wife, husband, son, daughter)
"sxl" sex--male(0) or female(l)
"bu" bargaining unit--(1/5 management, 2/3/4 union)
"famsize" family size
"days" average inpatient days
"clms" average total claims
"chg" average total charge
"doccl" average outside doctor claims
"docal" average outside doctor dollars
"scecl" average SCE doctor claims
"sceal" average SCE doctor dollars
"inpcl" average inpatient claims
"inpal" average inpatient dollars
"sucl" average surgical claims
"sual" average surgical dollars
"rxcl" average prescription claims
"rxal" average prescription dollars
"obcl" average obstetrical claims
"obal" average obstetrical dollars
"mhcl" average mental health claims
"mhal" average mental health dollars
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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON
HEALTH CARE PLANS
EMPLOYEE PLANS
RFu- Tme Employees
Employees on HMO's
Exhunied Benefits (COBRA)
DEPENDENT PLANS
Depedents of Full - Time Employees
Part-Time Employees
Deendents of Part - Time Employees
Dependents of Retirees
Suviving Spouses
Dependents on HMO's
Dependents of Retirees on Pilot Project (PRIME CARE)
ExtMded Beneflts (COBRA)
RETIREE PLANS
Rired Employees
Rebvrm on HMO's
Retirees on Pilot Project (PRIME CARE)
Exxided Beneft (COBRA)
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HEALTH CARE
MILESTONES
MEMBERS DEPENDENTS
1984 brought in from Aetna
Company was now self-insured
1985
1986 HMO's premiums became
free from Kaiser, reduce
to level of indemnity
for others
1987 HMO prices became equal
to that of the indemnity
plan.
1988 preferred provider network
approaches 7500 physicians
1989 *** HEALTH FLEX OPTIONS ***
1990 WELL BABY CARE
*** LIFE LINK MENTAL HEALTH ***
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Population Statistics
8y Group & Bucket
Group: ** Grand Total Summnary
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
8876
28500
13813
3558
1048
306
253
. ..
15.75X
50.57X
24.51X
6.31X
1.86X
0.54X
0.45X
.... oo.
3474
11991
5147
1470
534
179
156
........
39.14Z
42.07X
37.26X
41.32X
50.95Z
58.50X
61.66X
.......
40 17.39X
39 54.06X
30 20.43
31 5.41X
35 1.78Z
34 0.50X
35 0.43X
........ ......... ...
34
32
27
27
30
29
31
........
17.10%
53.07
21.63%
5.42
1.82X
0.51X
0.45X
.......
2
2
3
2
Total for: Group
* Grand Total Summary
Percent of Grand Total
56354 100.00X
100.00X
22951 100.00% 2054089 100.00X
40.73X 100.00X
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Switches
0 Switches
1 Switches
2 Switches
3 Switches
4 Switches
5 Switches
6 Switches
1742299 100.00
100.00%
36292 37748
11/18/88 Page 2
Population Statistics
By Same Grou & Family Size
Same Group: Grand Total Summary
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
50 50.51% 36 0.48%
1072 47.56% 38 11.25%
6488 34.46% 34 84.85%
358 53.75% 36 3.17%
30 58.82% 37 0.25%
........._.... -.. .........
Salary 85
Average Percent
30 0.46%
32 11.32%
29 85.05%
28 2.95%
28 0.22%
Before '85 Since '85
Average Average
2 1
Total for: Same Group
" Grand Total Summary
Percent of Grand Total
21899 100.00% 7998 100.00% 756143 100.00% 637282 100.00% 13683
100.00% 36.52% 100.00% 100.00%
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11/18/88 Page
Same Group
BOTH
ONE
SAME
TWO
ZERO
People
Total Percent
99 0.45%
2254 10.29%
18829 85.98%
666 3.04%
51 0.23X
12923
7Population Statistics
By Group & Relation
Page 2
Group: *- Grand Total Summary
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
---- ---- ..... ............... ..... ........... ..... .......... .....  ........ ........ ......... ........
16.84X
2.44X
38.86
0.13
17.70X
24.02X
4657 49.072
228 16.57X
7998 36.522
24 32.00X
4951 49.63X
5093 37.62X
41 18.97X
30 2.00X
35 36.81X
35 0.13X
41 19.90X
34 22.19X
34 18.63X
24 1.92X
29 36.58X
33 0.14X
34 19.56X
30 23.18X
9490
1376
21899
75
9976
13538
Total for: Group
" Grand Total Saumry
'ercent of Grand Total
56354 100.002
100.002
22951 100.00X 2054089 100.00X
40.73 100.00X
1742299 100.00X 36292
100.00X
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Population Statistics
By Same Group & FamiLy Size
Same Group: *' Grand Total Surmary
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since 85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Prcnt Average Percent Average Average
-- --- -- -- -- - --- -- -- -- - -- - - . . -- - - - -- - - - - .... ......
5565
6166
2915
4196
1970
732
232
83
28
6
4
2
.....
Total for: Same Grou
** Grand Total Sulmry
Percent of Grand Total
25.41%
28.16%
13.31%
19.16%
9.00%
3.34%
1.06%
0.38%
0.13%
0.03X
0.02%
0.01%
o...
21899 100.00%
100.00%
1867
1387
1254
1969
964
363
134
40
16
2
1
1
o.......
33.55%
22.49%
43.02X
46.93%
48.93%
49.59%
57.76X
48.19
57.14%
33.33%
25.00%
50.00%
.......
7998 100.00%
36.52X
31 22.91%
27 21.92%
38 14.69%
42 23.31%
43 11.10%
42 4.07%
42 1.29%
43 0.48%
44 0.16%
52 0.04%
40 0.02%
46 0.01%
........ .......
756143 100.00%
100.00%
23
25
32
35
36
36
37
37
38
46
35
40
........
20.33%
24.32%
14.82%
23.30%
11.06%
4.12%
1.34%
0.48%
0.17%
0.04%
0.02%
0.01%
.......
637282 100.00%
100.00%
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11/18/88 Page 2
Family Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
?
8
9
10
11
12
.... .........................
0 0
13683 12923
Population Statistics
By Same Group & FamiLy Size
Same Group: BOTH
Family Size
2
3
4
5
6
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
5
18
42
21
9
2
I
1
8
To for: Same Group
BOTH
Percent of Grand Total
5.05O
18.18%
42.42
21.21
9.09X
2.02X
1.01
1.01X
99 100.00X
0.45X
0
7
26
9
5
1
I
1
38.89X
61.90
42.86
55.56X
50.00X
100.00O
100.00X
50 100.00X
0.23X
26 3.58%
37 18.35X
36 42.21X
39 22.48
38 9.52X
37 2.031
38 1.05X
28 0.78X
3603 100.00X
0.48X
16 2.69
30 18.44
30 42.24X
31 22.31X
33 10.14%
32 2.18%
34 1.16X
25 0.85
2940 100.001
0.46X
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11/18/88
II
Page 3
2
3
2
3
3
239 106
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Family Size
Family Size People
Total Percent
2 561 24.89
3 534 23.69X
4 658 29.19X
5 322 14.29X
6 122 5.41%
7 39 1.73X
8 14 0.62
9 4 0.18X
ot or: S............................ ............
Tot or: Same Group
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
201 35.83 32 20.95X
256 47.94X 38 23.95X
341 51.82 40 31.12X
173 53.73X 41 15.45X
70 57.38X 40 5.72X
22 56.41 41 1.89X
6 42.86 45 0.731
3 75.00X 40 0.19X
........ ........ .......... ........ ..... .
Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
28 21.62X 1 1
32 23.62X 1 1
34 30.90X 1 1
34 15.27 1
34 5.67X 1
36 1.971 1 1
39 0.75% 1 1
36 0.20 2 1
. ...... ....... ........ ........
ONE
Percent of Grand Total
2254 100.00X
10.29X
1072 100.00X 85090 100.00X
4.90X 11.25X
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11/18/88
Same Group: ONE
I.
Page 4
72154 100.00X
11.32X
1917 1309
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Family Size
Family Size People
Total Percent
.... .. ....... ....... .......... ............ .......
Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
........ ........ .......... ........ ......... ....... --------. ........ ............ 
5565 29.56X 1867 33.552 31 27.012 23 23.902
2
3
4
5
6
5481 29.112
2215 11.762
3280 17.422
1497 7.952
546 2.902
158 0.842
60 0.322
18 0.102
4 0.022
3 0.022
2 0.01X
8
9
10
11
12
1126 20.542
915 41.312
1483 45.21X
712 47.562
256 46.892
90 56.962
27 45.002
8 44.442
2 50.00X
1 33.332
1 50.002
26 22.402
38 13.232
43 21.892
43 10.152
43 3.662
43 1.052
44 0.412
49 0.142
55 0.032
33 0.022
46 0.012
25 25.15
33 13.492
36 21.912
37 10.12
37 3.722
37 1.09X
38 0.422
42 0.142
47 0.032
28 0.022
40 0.01X
0
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
0
Total for: Same Growo
SANE
Percent of Grand Total
18829 100.002
85.982
6488 100.00%
29.63X
641554 100.002 541982 100.002 10634
84.852 85.05X
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Same Group: SAME
Page 5
0
10630
Population Statistics Page 6
By Same Group & Family Size
People Union Salary 88 SaLary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
100 15.02
137 20.572
203 30.48X
125 18.772
53 7.962
32 4.802
8 1.20X
5 0.752
2 0.302
1 0.152
8
10
11
;otal for: Same Group
TWO
Percent of Grand Total
666 100.002
3.042
51
70
109
67
30
21
6
4
0
0
51.002
51.092
53.692
53.60X
56.602
65.632
75.002
80.002
358 100.00X
1.632
34 14.18X 25 13.30X
35 19.732
36 30.512
38 19.582
38 8.29%
38 5.09
39 1.30X
33 0.68X
48 0.40X
60 0.25Z
23991 100.00X
3.17X
26 18.712
29 30.912
30 20.00X
31 8.76X
33 5.64X
28 1.19X
28 0.74X
45 0.4X
53 0.282
18793 100.00%
2.95X
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Same Group: TWO
Family Size
1 2
1 2
1 2
2 1
0 2
1 2
825 874
Population, Statistics
By Samne Group & FamiLy Size
Family Size People
Total Percent
2 19 37.25X
3 11 21.57X
4 13 25.49X
5 5 9.80X
6 2 3.922
7 1 1.96X
............................. .............
Total for: Same Group
ZERO 51 100.002
Percent of Grand Total 0.232
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
9 47.37X 36 36.33X
6 54.55 33 19.16X
10 76.922 39 26.82Z
3 60.00 39 10.18
2 100.00% 31 3.20
0 82 4.30X
........ ....... ........ .......
30 100.00 1905 100.002
0.14X 0.252
Salary 85 Before 85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
27 35.81 1 0
23 17.91% 2 0
29 27.11X 2 C
33 11.75X 2 0
28 3.89X 1 C
50 3.54 0 0
........ ........ ....... .... ........ .........
1413 100.00X
0.222
68
162
11/18/88
Same Group: ZERO
Page 7
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Uni on Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average
HHH 204
HI 23
HIH 10
I H 985
IHI 37
IIHN 7
11 980
UNKN 3
...................................
9.07X
1.02X
O.44X
43.80X
1.65X
0.31X
43.7X
0.13X
.......
116 56.86X 37
12 52.17X 38
3 30.00X 42
596 60.51X 36
22 59.46X 39
4 57.14X 37
518 52.86X 41
0 32
........ ....... ... .. ... .....
'Ota .or: Group
F 0-5 2249 100.00X 1271 100.00 86805 100.00X 66907 100.00X 2295
Percent of Grand Total
1/18/88
3roup: F 0-5
t?
Sex/Age
Page 12
People
Average
8.79X
1.00X
0.48X
41.33X
1.68
0.301
46.31
0.111
26
24
36
28
33
32
32
27
........
7.86X
0.84
0.54X
40.99
1.80X
0.33X
47.53X
0.12X
.......
2
2
1
2
3
0
0
3.99X 2.26X 4.23 3.84
676
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Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
People Union
Page 13
Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average
818 13.73% 426 52.08 39 12.87X 32 12.45X 0
77 1.29X 37 U4.O05 43 1.32 35 1.30X 1
44 0.74X 24 54.551 41 0.73 35 0.73X 2
1658 27.83X 956 57.66X 39 25.58% 31 24.57 1
91 1.531 45 49.45 40 1.45X 33 1.42 2
8 0.13X 2 25.00 43 0.14 37 0.14X 3
3250 54.561 1381 42.49X 44 57.77X 38 59.26X 0
11 0.18X 8 72.731 32 0.14X 26 0.14X 1
Tot for: Group
F 6-18
Percent of Grand Total
5957 100.00X
10.57
2879 100.00 249874 100.00%
5.11X 12.16X
164
11/18/88
Group: F 6-18
//
Sex/Age
HHH
HI
HIH
IH
IHI
IHIN
III
UNCK
Average
1
0
210230 100.00
12.07X
3328 4618
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
People Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
147 7.14%
13 0.63%
6 0.29X
440 21.38X
22 1.071
3 0.15%
1425 69.24%
2 0.10%
Tot. for: Group
F 19-25
Percent of Grand Total
2058 100.00%
3.65
11/18/88
Group: F 19-25
Sex/Age
Page 14
Union
HHH
HI
HIH
IHN
IHI
III
UNKN
77
3
3
270
10
3
547
1
52.38X
23.08%
50.00X
61.36X
45.45%
100.00%
38.39%
50.00%
0
36 6.69X
38 0.62X
40 0.30%
34 19.01%
34 0.94%
38 0.15%
40 72.18l
41 0.10%
78422 100.00%X
3.82X
29 6.90%
26 0.54%
35 0.34X
24 17.00
27 0.95X
32 0.15%
32 74.01X
37 0.12
62079 100.00%
3.56%
3
0
0
914 100.00%
1.62X
1251 1238
165
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent
383 12.46X
51 1.66X
28 0.91X
938 30.52X
60 1.95X
5 0.16X
1602 52.13%
6 0.20X
rot or: Group
F 26-32
Percent of Grand Total
3073 100.00X
5.45
218 56.92X
25 49.02X
12 42.86X
618 65.88
34 56.67X
3 60.00%
715 44.63X
3 50.00
1628 100.00X
2.89X
36 12.60X
35 1.65X
37 0.96X
35 30.35K
35 1.91X
34 0.16X
36 52.20K
32 0.18X
109120 100.00X
5.31X
Average Percent
26 12.31X
27 1.69X
31 1.07X
26 30.08X
28 2.04X
31 0.19%
27 52.42
26 0.19%
81952 100.00X
4.70X
Before '85 Since '85
Average Average
. _. ..
2
2
3
3
2726 1804
166
71/18/88
Group: F 26-32
Sex/Age
Page 15
HHH
HI
HIH
IH
IHI
IHIH
III
UNKN
... _ .. ._ .. ._ ..._ ..._
0
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
;rouo: F 33-40
Sex/Age Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
HHH
H
HI
HIH
IH
InIH
IIIIHIH111
UNI
'ot or: Group
F 33-40
Percent of Grand Total
11/18/88
fl/I
Page 16
People Union
40
40
42
39
39
34
41
38
10.43
1.55X
0.58X
20.11%
1.87
0.15X
65.12Z
0.19X
471 10.56X
70 1.57X
25 0.56X
937 21.01x
86 1.93X
8 0.18
2854 63.99%
9 0.20X
4460 100.00O
7.91X
32
35
35
31
32
30
34
31
10. 17X
1.65X
0.59X
19.59
1.87X
0.16X
65.78X
0.19X
.......
216 45.86%
19 27.14X
13 52.00%
523 55.82X
41 47.67%
2 25.00X
977 34.23X
6 66.67X
1797 100.00X
3.19X
2
3
0
180261 100.00X
8.78X
148262 100.00X
8.51X
2758 3315
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Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
People Union Salary 88
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent
..._................. ....... . ........ ....... ......... ...... ..
Sex/Age
HH
HI
HIH
IH
IHI
IHIH
IIl
UNIK
317 6.30X
36 0.712
15 0.30
651 12.932
38 0.75X
5 0.10X
3968 78.81%
5 0.10%
Tot or: Group
F 41-55
Percent of Grand Total
5035 100.00
8.93X
127
6
5
287
8
2
1208
0
40.06X
16.67X
33.332
44.09%
21.05
40.00%
30.44
1643 100.00X
2.92Z
40 6.07X
42 0.722
47 0.34X
40 12.432
41 0.75X
38 0.092
42 79.522
36 0.092
210554 100.00X
10.252
Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
35 5.922 0 1
35 0.672 1 1
42 0.342 2 1
34 11.8X 1 1
41 0.83 2 1
33 0.09X 3 1
38 80.1 10 
32 0.09M 1 1
187073 100.00O
10.74
2072 3895
168
11/18/88
Group: F 41-55
is
Page 17
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Group: F 56-64
Sex/Age People
Total Percent
HHH 74 3.352
HI
IH
IHI
III
UNKN
15 0.68X
79 3.57X
11 0.50X
2031 91.82X
2 0.09X
Total for: Group
F 56-64
ercent of Grand Total
Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
.. . ... .. . .. ... .... .. .... .. ...... . .... . .... .... -- -- -
20
2
20
1
240
2
2212 100.00X
3.93X
27.03
13.33X
25.32X
9.09X
11.82X
100.00X
.. .
285 100.00X
0.51X
26
31
29
24
25
31
3.45X
0.85
4.19X
0.47
90.93
0.11
...
55394 100.00X
2.70X
28
32
30
37
28
27
3.39X 0 1
0.76X 1 1
3.78X 1 1
0.65 3 1
91.34X 1 1
0.09X 1 1
- -- - ..... ... . ..... ...
62233 100.00X
3.57X
154 1889
169
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/i6
Page 18
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Group: F 65 & over
Sex/Age
HHN
HI
NIH
People
Total Percent
48 1.72X
12 0.432
1 0.042
39 1.40X
8 0.29X
2679 96.122
.............
IHI
II!
Total for: Group
F 65 & over
ercent of Grand Total
2787 100.002
4.952
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
1 2.082 11 1.992
1 8.33 11 0.532
0 8 0.03%
2 5.132 13 1.942
0 10 0.312
38 1.42% 9 95.202
..... . ....... ..............
42 100.002
0.07
25365 100.00
1.232
Salary 85 Before '85 Since 85
Average Percent Average Average
........ ........ o ........... ..--
12 2.05X 0 1
14 0.622 2 1
8 0.032 3 1
14 1.992 1 1
10 0.282 2 1
10 95.032 1 1
.... .... ...... ........ . ....
27555 100.00X
1.582
2548 2984
170
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Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Sex/Age People
Total Percent
HHH 197 8.45
HI 9 0.39
HIH 2 0.09X
IH 1035 .382
IHI 39 1.67X
IHIH 7 0.30X
III 1042 4.68X
UNKM 1 O.O04
.......................................
Union
Total Percent
98 49.75
6 66.67X
2 100.00X
679 65.602
21 53.85%
1 14.292
528 50.67X
1 100.002
.... ... .......
Salary 88
Average Percent
39 8.37X
40 0.39
38 0.08X
36 41.42
38 1.64X
43 0.33X
42 47.722
34 0.042
.... ... . .....
Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
29 8.01X 1 1
29 0.37X 1 1
32 0.09X 3 1
28 40.84X 1 0
31 1.68X 2 0
37 0.362 3 0
33 48.60 1 0
31 0.04 1 0
............... ....... ........
Tot for: Group
M 0-5
Percent of Grand Total
2332 100.0
4.14
1336 100.00 91201 100.00X
2.37X 4.442
171
11/18/88
Group: M 0-5
Page 20
70990 100.00X
4.07X
2355 729
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Union
Page 21
Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
826 13.14%
75 1.191
53 0.84X
1739 27.671
83 1.32X
10 0.16X
3488 55.51%
10 0.16X
449 54.36%
32 42.67
22 41.51%
1011 58.14%
42 50.601
2 20.00%
1535 44.01%
9 90.00%
39 12.26%
40 1.14%
43 0.86%
38 25.44X
40 1.28%
43 0. 17
44 58.72%
35 0.131
32 12.18
33 1.14%
37 0.90X
31 24.37
34 1.30X
35 0.16X
38 59.801
31 0.14X
2
3
0
Tot, or: Group
M 6-18
Percent of Grand Total
6284 100.00X
11.15%
3102 100.001
5.50X
261751 100.00X 219389 100.001 3545
12.74% 12.591
172
11/18/88
Group: 6-18
/ (
Sex/Age People
HHH
HI
HIH
IH
IHI
IHIH
II1
UN0
4812
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Group: M 19-25
Sex/Age People Union SaLary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
AverageTotal Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average
61 44.85X 38
3 23.08% 43
1 33.33X 41
143 54.17% 37
12 63.16% 36
645 45.74% 40
2 66.67% 34
.. .. . .. . ... .
rotal for: Group
4 19-25
Percent of Grand Total
1848 100.00%
3.28X
867 100.00%
1.54X
72749 100.00% 57806 100.00X
3.54% 3.32%
173
HHH
HI
IH
III
UNKN
136 7.36%
13 0.70%
3 0.16%
264 14.29X
19 1.03%
1410 76.30%
3 0.16X
.... .. . .
7.10%
0.77%
0.17%
13.30%
0.93%
77.59%
0.14%
29 6.82
42 0.94%X
35 0.18%
27 12.54%
31 1.03X
32 78.34X
29 0.15%
.. ... . . . .
2
2
2
0
0
.. .. 
988 1196
Page 2211/18/88
11/18/88 Population Statistics Page 23
By Grou & Age/Sex
Sroup: M 26-32
Sex/Age People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
........................................... ........ ....... ........ ......... ..................... ........
HHN 226 8.071 146 64.60X 35 8.151 26 8.40X 1 1
Hl 40 1.431 24 60.00X 39 1.571 30 1.70X 1 2
HIH 17 0.611 7 41.18X 39 0.682 32 0.78 3 2
IH 703 25.12X 488 69.42X 34 24.461 24 24.25X 2 0
IHi 35 1.251 24 68.571 36 1.28 28 1.40 3 1
IHIH 3 0.111 3 100.00X 31 0.09X 23 0.101 5 1
111 1774 63.38 1212 68.32X 35 63.74 25 63.33 1 0
UNKN 1 0.041 0 29 0.031 26 0.04X 1 0
Tot. for: Group
N 26-32 2799 100.001 1904 100.00 98390 100.00X 70434 100.00X 2839 1468
Percent of Grand Total 4.97X 3.381 4.79X 4.04X
174
A11/18/88 Population Statistics Page 24
By Group & Age/Sex
:roup: 33-40
Sex/Age People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
HHH 373 8.99% 205 54.96% 39 8.67% 31 8.46% 0 2
HI 40 0.96% 16 40.00% 39 0.92% 33 0.98% 1 2
HIH 22 0.53% 14 63.64 39 0.51% 34 0.54% 3 2
IH 831 20.13% 494 59.45% 37 18.35X 29 17.62% 2 1
IHI 61 1.47% 30 49.18% 41 1.47X 35 1.54% 3 1
IHIH 8 0.19% 6 75.00% 41 0.19% 33 0.19% 4 1
III 2812 67.79% 1425 50.68% 42 69.88% 34 70.65% 0 0
UNkN 1 0.02% 0 34 0.02% 28 0.02% 0 1
........................................ ....... ........ ............. - - ............... ........... ........
,ot, or: Group
M 33-40 4148 100.00% 2190 100.00% 169756 100.00% 136942 100.00X 3099 2575
Percent of Grand Total 7.36% 3.89% 8.26% 7.86%
175
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
........ ....... .... .... . ....... .........
133 42.22%
23 41.821
7 46.67%
277 43.21
24 39.34X
2 33.33%
1851 38.35X
42 4.89
43 0.89X
40 0.22
39 9.41%
40 0.92
40 0.09X
46 83.58X
Salary 85 Before '85
Average Percent Average
35 4.73 0
37 0.87% 1
35 0.23X 3
32 8.87% 2
36 0.95X 3
35 0.09X 4
40 84.27% 0
Total for: Group
41-55
Percent of Grand Total
5920 100.00X
10.51X
2317 100.00X
4.11X
267648 100.00
13.03X
230935 100.00X 2606
13.25X
176
11/18/88
Group: M 41-55
Page 25
Sex/Age
HHH
HI
IH
IHI
IHIH
III
People
Total Percent
315 5.321
55 0.93
15 0.25X
641 10.83
61 1.03X
6 0.10X
4827 81.54
Since '85
Average
2
2
2
2620
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Sex/Age People
Total Percent
NHH 32 1.34%
Hi 11 0.46%
HIH 1 0.04%
IH 56 2.35%
IHI 9 0.38%
III 2279 95.44%
............................. ........................... ..... ........
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
17 53.13% 28 1.31%
2 18.18% 35 0.56%
0 5 0.01%
17 30.36% 32 2.55X
2 22.22% 22 0.28%
380 16.67% 29 95.30%
........ ....... ................
Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
26 1.07% 0 2
37 0.51tX 2 2
23 0.03X 4 2
32 2.26% 2 0
37 0.42% 3 1
33 95.71% 0 0
......... -- - - ........ ..........
Total for: Group
N 56-64
'ercent of Grand Total
2388 100.00%
4.24%
418 100.00% 69408 100.00%
0.74% 3.38X
177
11/18/88
Group: M 56-64
_>?
Page 26
78870 100.00%
4.53%
1258 1113
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Group: 65 & over
Sex/Age People
Total Percent
HHH 12 0.49X
HI 3 0.12X
IH 16 0.65X
IHI 3 0.12X
III 2439 98.631
, .................................. .........
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
........ ....... ....... .......
1 8.331 12 0.54S
0 7 0.07x
2 12.50 20 1.17X
0 10 0.11
24 0.98X 11 98.11
........ ....... ... ..... .....
Salary
Average
18
6
17
22
12
85 Before '85 Since '85
Percent Average Average
0.70X 0 2
0.06X 1 3
0.91 1 1
0.221 3 1
98.12X 0 1
-- - - ........ ... .....
Total for: Group
n 65 & over
Percent of Grand Total
2473 100.00X
4.39X
27 100.001 27391 100.00X 30642 100.00X
0.051 1.331 1.761
178
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1080 2816
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Same Group: " Grand Total Summary
Same Group
.............................
BOTH
ONE
SAE
TWO
ZERO
.............................
Total for: Same Group
- Grand Total Sugry
Percent of Grand Total
People
Total Percent
...... .. .
405 0.72X
7361 13.06X
45462 80.67X
2524 4.481
602 1.07X
... . .------
56354 100.00O
100.00X
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
219 54.07X 36 0.70X
3725 50.60X 39 13.80X
17406 38.29X 36 80.45X
1419 56.22X 36 4.45X
182 30.23X 20 0.60X
........ ....... ........ ......
Salary
Average
29
32
31
29
17
85 Before '85 Since '85
Percent Average Average
0.68X 1
13.69X 1 1
80.88X 1 1
4.15% 1
0.60X 1
22951 100.001 2054089 100.00X 1742299 100.001 36292
40.731 100.00X 100.001
37748
179
11/18/88 Page
Page ZPopulation Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Same Group: - Grand Total Summary
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
...... ....... ........ .......................... . - ........ ........
4585 8.14 2317 50.531 38 8.50 31 8.06X
544
242
11093
671
70
39094
55
0.97X
0.43
19.68X
1.19
0.12X
69.37X
0.10O
212
113
6464
324
30
13458
33
38.97X
46.69
58.27X
48.29X
42.86X
34.42
60.00X
39 1.03X
41 0.481
37 19.94X
38 1.23X
39 0.13
36 68.60
34 0.09X
32 1.01X
35 0.49X
29 18.48X
32 1.24%
33 0.13%
31 70.50X
28 0.09X 0
Tot for: Same Group
"- Grand Total Summary
Percent of Grand Total
56354 100.00O
100.001
22951 100.00X 2054089 100.001
40.731 100.001
1742299 100.00% 36292
100.00X
180
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Switch Group
HHH
HI
HIH
IH
IHI
HIH
III
UNIK
37748
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Switch Group People
Total Percent
........ ......... ... ..... ...... .. .. .. ...... .
HHH
HI
HIH
IH
IHI
IHIH
UNKN
84 20.74X
20 4.94%
28 6.91X
243 60.00X
19 4.69
7 1.73%
2 0.492
2 0.492
Tot for: Same Group
BOTH
Percent of Grand Total
405 100.00Z
0.72%
Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
... .......... ........ .......... .... .... ----- ---------- .. .... ..
42 50.00% 38 22.05X
8 40.00X 36 4.97
15 53.57X 39 7.50%
142 58.44X 35 58.48X
6 31.58X 33 4.30
4 57.14% 34 1.65%
2 100.002 32 0.44%
0 44 0.612
219 100.002 14438 100.00X
0.39X 0.70S
32 22.55%
29 4.95X
33 7.70X
28 58.20%
25 4.07X
28 1.66%
23 0.39X
29 0.49X
11890 100.00%
0.68X
2
1
0
0
574 232
181
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Same Group: BOTH
Page 3
11/18/88 Population Statistics Page 4
By Same Group & Switch Group
Same Group: ONE
Switch Group People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before 85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
.................................... _ ........ ........ ...... ........ ....... ........ ............... ......
HH 1012 13.75X 506 50.00X 37 13.32 30 12.93X 1 1
HI 224 3.04X 85 37.95 40 3.19, 35 3.24X 1 1
HIH 114 1.55 56 49.12X 43 1.71 37 1.77X 2 1
IN 3870 52.57 2098 54.21X 39 53.09 33 52.882 1 1
IHI 289 3.93X 146 50.52 39 3.97% 33 4.05X 2 1
IHIH 32 0.43 9 28.13 40 0.45X 35 O.46 3 1
III 1806 24.53X 820 45.402 38 24.122 32 24.502 0 1
UNKN 14 0.19X 5 35.712 32 0.16X 28 0.16X 1 1
............................ ...... o ........ o ....... ............... ............... ...... ........ ........
Tot for: Same Group
ONE 7361 100.00X 3725 100.00% 283454 100.00% 238531 100.00% 7877 4510
Percent of Grand Total 13.06X 6.61X 13.802 13.692
182
Population Statistics
By Sme Group & Switch Group
Page 5
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since 85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
.... .... ....... .............................. ............... ........ ....----
2605
208
55
5582
294
7
36676
35
5.73X
0.46X
0.12x
12.28X
0.65%
0.02%
80.67%
0.08%
1282
81
23
3367
141
6
12479
27
49.21%
38.94X
41.82X
60.32
47.96%
85.71%
34.021
77.14
39 6.09
37 0.47X
40 0.13
36 12.24%
36 0.64
36 0.021
36 80.34%
33 0.07
..... .......
31
31
34
27
31
27
32
28
5.72%
0.45X
0.13%
10.76%
0.65X
0.01%
82.20%
0.07%
o......
0
0
0
To for: Same Group
SAME
Percent of Grand Total
45462 100.00%
80.67X
17406 100.00X 1652474 100.001
30.89X 80.45X
183
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Same Group: SAME
Switch Group
HHH
HI
HIH
IHI
IHI
UNKN
1409178 100.001
80.88
24722 30952
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
People Union SeLery 88
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent
...... ....... ........ ...... ........ .....
870 34.47X 478 54.942 37 35.582
89 3.53X 38 42.70 39 3.812
45 1.78X 19 42.22X 39 1.912
1300 51.512 785 60.38X 35 49.52
65 2.58 31 47.69 39 2.762
24 0.95X 11 45.83X 41 1.08X
129 5.112 57 4.19X 37 5.262
2 0.082 0 40 O.09X
...... ....... ........ ....... ...............
Salary 85
Average Percent
30 36.01X
32 3.902
33 2.04
27 48.52X
32 2.90X
35 1.15S
30 5.392
32 0.09X
........ .......
Tot 'or: Same Group
TWO
Percent of Grand Totel
2524 100.00
4.48
1419 100.00X 91449 100.00X
2.52X 4.45
184
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Same Group: TO
Switch Group
U
Page 6
HHH
HI
HIH
IH
IHI
IHIH
III
U#KN
Since '85
Average
Before '85
Average
........
0
3
1
2
3
0
72234 100.00%
4.15X
2541 1637
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Switch Group PeopLe
Total Percent
.... .............................. ........
HHH 14 2.33X
H1 3 0.50%
IH 98 16.28X
II 4 0.66%
III 481 79.90%
UNKM 2 0.33X
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
9 64.29X 26 3.01X
0 48 1.17X
72 73.47% 32 25.88X
0 35 1.131
100 20.79X 17 68.18%
1 50.00% 39 0.63%
Salary 85
Average Percent
20 2.72X
47 1.35X
22 20.99
31 1.18X
16 73.09%
35 0.66%
........ .......
Before '85 Since 85
Average Average
........ ........ ....
2
Total for: Same Group
ZERO
Percent of Grand Total
602 100.00X
1.071
182 100.00X 12274 100.001 10466 100.00%
0.32X 0.601 0.60X
185
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Same Group: ZERO
Page 7
578 417
0
.......
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Switch Grop People
Total Percent
... ... ....... ...... ....................
BOTH 84
ONE 1012
SAME 2605
TWO 870
ZERO 14
................ o . .....
1.83S
22.071
56.821
18.971
0.31%
.......
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
........ ............. .......
42 50.00% 38 1.821
506 50.00X 37 21.63%
1282 49.21% 39 57.69%
478 54.94X 37 18.64
9 64.29% 26 0.21%
........ ......................
Salary 85 Before 85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
........ ............... ........
32 1.91% 0 1
30 21.96X 1 1
31 57.41% 0 1
30 18.52% 0 1
20 0.20X 1 0
........ ....... ........ ......
Total for: Same Group
HHn
Percent of Grand Total
11/18/88
Same Group: HH
3 /
Page 8
4585 100.00%
8.14%
2317 100.00%
4.11%
174538 100.00%
8.50
140460 100.00X
8.06%
1870 5074
186
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Switch Group People
Total Percent
...........................................
80TH 20 3.68%
ONE 224 41.18%
SAME 208 38.24%
TWO 89 16.36%
ZERO 3 0.55X
,................. . . . . .. . . . . .. .
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
......... ...................
8 40.00% 36 3.39%
85 37.95% 40 42.76%
81 38.94% 37 36.69%
38 42.70X 39 16.48%
0 48 0.68%
Salary 85 Before 85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
........ ........
29 3.34% 2 2
35 43.88X 1 1
31 36.01% 1 1
32 15.97% 1 1
47 0.80X 1 1
........ . .............
Total for: Same Group
HlI
Percent of Grand Total
544 100.00%
0.97X
212 100.00% 21153 100.00% 17625 100.00%
O.U38 1.03% 1.01%
187
11/18/88
Same Group: i
Page 
Page 9
663 706
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Switch Group People
Total Percent
................................... ......
BOTH 28 11.57X
ONE 114 47.11X
SAME 55 22.731
TWO 45 18.60X
... .. . . . . ... ... .... -- - - -- - -
Total for: Same Group
HIH
Percent of Grand Total
242 100.00X
0.43X
Uni on
Total Percent
15 53.57X
56 49.12X
23 41.82X
19 42.22
Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
........ ...... . ....................... ........
39 10.96
43 49.10X
40 22.24%
39 17.69%
33 10.791 3 1
37 49.71 2 1
34 22.17X 2 1
33 17.33X 3 1
...--- ---- .. .. ... . .... .... ... 
113 100.00% 9877 100.00% 8486 100.001
0.20 0.4X 0.49X
592 300
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Same Group: HH
'7 
Page 10
Population Statistics
By Samne Grou & Switch Group
Switch Group People
Total Percent
.. .................................. ....
BOTH 243 2.19X
ONE 3870 34.89X
SAME 5582 50.32X
TWO 1300 11.721
ZERO 98 0.88X
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
142 58.44 35 2.06
2098 54.21 39 36.741
3367 60.32 36 49.37
785 60.38X 35 11.06%
72 73.47 32 0.78X
Salary 85
Average Percent
28 2.15
33 39.18X
27 47.10
27 10.891
22 0.68X
Before 85 Since '85
Average Average
1 0
Total for: Same Group
IN
Percent of Grand Total
11093 100.00%
19.68X
6464 100.00 409587 100.00X 321906 100.00X 16317
11.47X 19.94X 18.48X
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Same Group: In
Page 11
4939
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Switch Group People
Total Percent
................. .........................
8OTH 19 2.3X
ONE 289 43.07
SAME 294 43.82
TWO 65 9.69
ZERO 4 0.602
............................. ...... .....
Total for: Same Group
INI 671 100.00X
Percent of Grand Total 1.19X
Union Selary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
........ ....... ...... .......
6 31.58X 33 2.47
146 50.52X 39 44.67
141 47.96X 36 42.30X
31 47.69 39 10.01
0 35 0.55X
..... o ............... .......
Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Average Percent Average Average
25 2.24X 3 0
33 44.79 2 1
31 42.68X 3 1
32 9.71 2 1
31 0.57% 1 1
.............. ........ ......
324 100.00% 25165 100.00X 21589 100.00X
0.57X 1.23X 1.24
1632 401
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Same Group: IHI
Page 12
Population Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Growu
Switch Group People
Total Percent
BOTH 7 10.00X
ONE 32 45.71
SAME 7 10.00%X
TWO 24 34.29
Total for: Same Group
IHIH 70 100.00X
Percent of Grand Total 0.12X
Union Salary 88
Total Percent Average Percent
4 57.14% 34 8.70X
9 28.13% 40 46.26%
6 85.71X 36 9.10X
11 45.83% 41 35.95X
30 100.00X 2737 100.00%
0.05X 0.13X
Salary 85
Average Percent
28 8.46
35 47.49%
27 8.24%
35 35.81%
2329 100.00%
0.13X
Before '85 Since '85
Average Average
4 1
3 1
0
238 52
191
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Same Group: IHIN
I-
Page 13
j/
Poputation Statistics
By Same Group & Switch Group
Page 14
Pople Union Salary 88 Satlry 85 Before 85 Since 85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
... ...... . ....... ............... ....... ............... ........ ........
2 100.00% 32
820 45.40% 38 4.852
12479 34.02X 36 94.21%
57 44.19% 37 0.34%
100 20.79 17 0.59X
........ ......................
Totat for: Same Group
111
Percent of Grard TotaL
39094 100.00%
69.37%
13458 100.002 1409178 100.002 1228339 100.002 14934
23.882 68.60X 70.50'
192
11/18/88
Same Group: III
Switch Group
BOTH
ONE
SAE
TWO
ZERO
.............................
2
1806
36676
129
481
0.01%
4.62X
93.81
0.332
1.232
.......
023
32
32
30
16
0
0
4.76%
94.30%
0.32%
0.62X
26250
Population Statistics
By Group & Age/Sex
Group: * Grand Total Summary
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
331 0.59%
2249 3.99%
5957 10.57%
2058 3.65%
3073 5.45%
4460 7.91%
5035 8.93X
2212 3.93%
2787 4.95%
2332 4.14%
6284 11.15%
184 3.28%
2799 4.97X%
4148 7.36%
5920 10.51X
2388 4.24%
2473 4.39%
... o .....
331
1271
2879
914
1628
1797
1643
285
42
1336
3102
867
1904
2190
2317
418
27
100.00%
56.51%
48.33%
44.41%
52.98%
40.29%
32.63%
12.88%
1.51%
57.29%
49.36%
46.92X
68.02%
52.80X
39.14%
17.50X
1.09%
Total for: GrotU
*' Grand Total Sunry
Percent of Grand Total
56354 100.00%
100.00X
22951 100.00% 2054089 100.00X
40.73X 100.00X
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Sex/Age
/g
Page 2
0-5
F 0-5
F 6-18
F 19-25
F 26-32
F 33-40
F 41-55
F 56-64
F 65 & over
M 0-5
M 6-18
M 19-25
M 26-32
M 33-40
N 41-55
- N 56-64
N 65 & over
0
39 4.23%
42 12.16%
38 3.82%
36 5.31%
40 8.78T
42 10.25%
25 2.70%
9 1.23%
39 4.44%
42 12.74%
39 3.54%
35 4.79%
41 8.26%
45 13.03%
29 3.38X
11 1.33
........ .......
0
30
35
30
27
33
37
28
10
30
35
31
25
33
39
33
12
...... oo
3.84%
12.07%
3.56%
4.70%
8.51%
10.74X
3.57%
1.58%
4.07%
12.59%
3.32%
4.04%
7.86%
13.25%
4.53%
1.76%
.......
0
0
0
1742299 100.00%
100.00%
37748
I!/
Population Statistics Page 6
By GrouD & Age/Sex
Peopie Union Salary 88 Stlary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
81
985
1658
440
938
937
651
79
39
1035
1739
264
703
831
641
56
16
0.73X
8.88X
14.95X
3.97%
8.46
8.45X
5.871
0.71X
0.351
9.33
15.68X
2.381
6.34:
7.491
5.78X
0.501
0.14S
.......
81
596
956
270
618
523
287
20
2
679
1011
143
488
494
277
17
2
.. ooo.o.
100.00
60.51X
57.66X
61.36X
65.88
55.821
44.09X
25.321
5.131
65.601
58.14
54.17%
69.42
59.45X
43.211
30.361
12.501
.......
0
36
39
34
35
39
40
29
13
36
38
37
34
37
39
32
20
........
8.76X
15.61X
3.64X
8.09X
8.85X
6.391
0.571
0.121
9.22X
16.26X
2.36X
5.88X
7.601
6.151
0.431
0.08X
... ....
0
28 8.52%
31 16.05X
24 3.281
26 7.66X
31 9.02X
34 6.91X
30 0.73
14 0.17%
28 9.01X
31 16.61%
27 2.25X
24 5.31X
29 7.501
32 6.361
32 0.551
17 0.09%
,- - - __-----.....
0 0
1 0
1 1
1 0
2 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
1 1
2 0
2 0
2 1
2 0
2 0
IH
Percent of Grar Total
11093 100.00X
19.68X
6464 100.001
11.47
409587 100.001 321906 100.00X
19.941 1.41X
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Group: H
Sex/Age
0-5
F 0-5
F 6-18
F 19-25
F 26-32
F 33-40
F 41-55
F 56-64
F 65 & over
M 0-5
N 6-18
N 19-25
M 26-32
M 33-40
M 41-55
M 56-64
N 65 & over
. ..........................
rotal for: Group
16317 4939
11/18/88 Population Statistics Page 4
By Group & Age/Sex
Group: H I
Sex/Age People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
0-5 1 0.18 1 100.001 0 a 0 0
F 0-5 23 4.23 12 52.17X 38 4.10X 24 3.17 2 1
F 6-18 77 14.15 37 48.05 43 15.54X 35 15.46 1 
F 19-25 13 2.39X 3 23.08X 38 2.31X 26 1.90Z 1 1
F 26-32 51 9.38 25 49.02X 35 8.50X 27 7.86X 1 1
F 33-40 70 12.871 19 27.141 40 13.25% 35 13.86 1 1
F 41-55 36 6.621 6 16.67X 42 7.21X 35 7.14% 1 1
F 56-64 15 2.761 2 13.33X 31 2.23X 32 2.70X 1 t
F 65 & over 12 2.211 1 8.331 11 0.63X 14 0.97X 2 1
n 0-5 9 1.65X 6 66.67X 40 1.70X 29 1.50X 1 1
N 6-18 75 13.791 32 42.671 40 14.07X 33 14.14% 1 1
N 19-25 13 2.39X 3 23.08Z 43 2.661 42 3.10X 1 1
M 26-32 40 7.35 24 60.00X 39 7.29X 30 6.80X 1 2
N 33-40 40 7.35X 16 40.00% 39 7.361 33 7.58 1 2
N 41-55 55 10.11% 23 41.821 43 11.231 37 11.40X 1 2
N 56-64 11 2.02X 2 18.18X 35 1.82 37 2.30X 2 2
N 65 & over 3 0.55% 0 7 0.09X 6 0.11 1 3
........................... ..... ........ ............. ....... ........ ........ ....... ........ .........
Total for: Group
HI 54 100.00 212 100.00X 21153 100.00X 17625 100.00 663 T06
Percent of Grand Total 0.97X 0.38X 1.031 1.01
195
Population Statistics
By Grou & Age/Sex
Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average
100.00 0
59.462 39 5.802
49.45X 40 14.44
45.452 34 2.93X
56.672 35 8.29X
47.672 39 13.40X
21.052 41 6.242
9.09X 24 1.032
10 0.312
53.852 38 5.962
50.602 40 13.322
63.162 36 2.682
68.57X 36 5.012
49.182 41 9.942
39.34X 40 9.76X
22.222 22 0.772
10 0.122
............... .......
Total for: Group
INl
Percent of Grand Total
671 100.00X
1.19X
324 100.002
0.572
25165 100.002 21589 100.002
.232 1.242
196
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Group: IHI
Sex/Age
Page 7
People
Average
2
0-5
F 0-5
F 6-18
F 19-25
F 26-32
F 33-40
F 41-55
F 56-64
F 65 & over
N 0-5
N 6-18
N 19-25
M 26-32
M 33-40
N 41-55
n 56-64
M 65 & over
0
8
37
91
22
60
86
38
11
8
39
83
19
35
61
61
9
3
o...
1.19X
5.512
13.56X
3.28
8.94X
12.822
5.662
1.642
1.192
5.812
12.37X
2.832
5.22S
9.092
9.09S
1.342
0.452
.......
2
8
22
45
10
34
41
8
1
0
21
42
12
24
30
24
2
0
..... .. o
........ .......
0
33 5.572
33 13.822
27 2.732
28 7.75%
32 12.842
41 7.17X
37 1.86X
10 0.36X
31 5.542
34 13.26X
31 2.752
28 4.582
35 9.767
36 10.162
37 t.55X
22 o.z21
"I'll" 4 -- ,---
2
2
2
2
0
3
3
3
3
1632 401
Population Statistics Page 8
By Gro & Age/Sex
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since 85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
7 10.00X
8 11.432
3 4.29
5 7.14X
8 11.43X
5 7.142
7 10.00X
10 14.29X
3 4.292
8 11.432
6 8.572
70 100.00
Percent of Grand Total 0.12
4 57.14X
2 25.00X
3 100.00X
3 60.00X
2 25.00X
2 40.00X
1 14.29
2 20.00X
3 100.00X
6 75.00X
2 33.33X
37 9.54X
43 12.46X
38 4.172
34 6.21X
34 9.94X
38 6.91X
43 10.96X
43 15.78X
31 3.40x
41 11.95X
40 8.70X
........ .......
32 9.53X
37 12.71X
32 4.12
31 6.74X
30 10.39X
33 7.08X
37 11.03X
35 15.11
23 2.92X
33 11.38
35 8.97X
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
0
0
30 100.00X 2737 100.00X 2329 100.00X 238 52
0.05; 0.13X 0.13X
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group: IHIH
Sex/Age
F 0-5
F 6-18
F 19-25
F 26-32
F 33-40
F 41-55
n 0-5
N 6-18
N 26-32
# 33-40
M 41-55
Total for: Group
NIH
I7
11/18/88 Population Statistics Page 9
By Grou & Age/Sex
Group: I I
Sex/Age People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since 85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
0-5 234 0.60X 234 100.00 0 0 0 0
F 0-5 980 2.512 518 52.862 41 2.852 32 2.59X 1 0
F 6-18 3250 8.312 1381 42.49 44 10.242 38 10.14X 0 1
F 19-25 1425 3.652 547 38.39X 40 4.02 32 3.742 0 1
F 26-32 1602 4.102 715 44.63% 36 4.04% 27 3.502 0 1
F 33-40 2854 7.30X 977 34.23X 41 8.332 34 7.942 0 1
F 41-55 3968 10.152 1208 30.442 42 11.88 38 12.212 0 1
F 56-64 2031 5.202 240 11.822 25 3.572 28 4.632 1 1
F 65 L& over 2679 6.85x 38 1.422 9 1.712 10 2.13X 1 1
1 0-5 1042 2.672 528 50.672 42 3.09 33 2.812 1 0
N 6-18 3488 8.922 1535 44.012 44 10.912 38 10.68% 0 1
N 19-25 1410 3.612 645 45.742 40 4.012 32 3.69X 0 1
M 26-32 1774 4.542 1212 68.322 35 4.452 25 3.632 1 0
N 33-40 2812 7.192 1425 50.682 42 8.42% 34 7.882 0 0
n 41-55 4827 12.352 1851 38.352 46 15.88X 40 15.842 0 0
N 56-64 2279 5.832 380 16.67X 29 4.69 33 6.152 0 0
N 65 L over 2439 6.242 24 0.98% 11 1.912 12 2.452 0 1
............... ...................... ............... ....... .. ..... ........ ....... ........ ........
'otal for: Grop
111 39094 100.00X 13458 100.002 1409178 100.00 1228339 100.00 14934 26250
Percent of Grand Total 69.372 23.M &.602 70.502
198
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Population Statistics Page 10
By Group & Age/Sex
People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
1 1.82X
3 5.45
11 20.00%
2 3.64X
6 10.91X
9 16.36X
5 9.09X
2 3.64%
1 1.821
10 18.181
3 5.45X
1 1.82X
1 1.82X
1 100.00%
0
8 72.73Z
1 50.001
3 50.00%
6 66.67X
0
2 100.00X
1 100.001
9 90.001
2 66.67X
0
32
32
41
32
38
36
31
34
35
34
29
34
5.12X
19.04%
4.37%
10.30%
18.39%
9.82X
3.29%
1.83%
18.99
5.45X
1.56%
1.83%
0
27
26
37
26
31
32
27
31
31
29
26
28
0
5.11X
18.47X
4.66%
9.90X
17.64%
10.221
3.45%
1.98X
19.55%
5.56%
1.66X
1.79X
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Total for: Group
UNKIN
Percent of Grand Total
55 100.00%
0.10%
33 100.00%
0.06X
1854 100.00X 1565 100.00X
0.091 0.09X
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GrouP: UNKN
Sex/Age
0-5
F 0-5
F 6-18
F 19-25
F 26-32
F 33-40
F 41-55
F 56-64
N 0-5
M 6-18
N 19-25
n 26-32
M 33-40
46 26
11/18/88 PopuLation Statistics Page 3
By Group & Age/Sex
Group: HHH
Sex/Age People Union SaLary 88 SaLary 85 Before '85 Since 85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
.............................. ...... ....... .... .... ............... ....... ... - - ........ ............
0-5 6 0.13X 6 100.00X 0 0 0
F 0-5 204 4.45 116 56.86X 37 4.37X 26 3.74X 1
F 6-18 818 17.84X 426 52.08 39 18.43X 32 18.64 0 1
F 19-25 147 3.21X 77 52.38S 36 3.01X 29 3.05 0 1
F 26-32 383 8.351 218 56.921 36 7.88 26 7.18X 1 1
F 33-40 471 10.27S 216 45.86X 40 10.771 32 10.74X 0 1
F 41-55 317 6.91S 127 40.061 40 7.32 35 7.89X 0 1
F 56-64 74 1.61X 20 27.03X 26 1.09 28 1.50X 0 1
F 65 & over 48 1.05X 1 2.08X 11 0.291 12 0.40X 0 1
M 0-5 197 4.30X 98 49.75X 39 4.37 29 4.05X 1 1
N 6-18 826 18.02X 449 54.36 39 18.39 32 19.03 0 1
n 19-25 136 2.971 61 44.85 38 2.96 29 2.81 0 1
M 26-32 226 4.93 146 64.60X 35 4.59 26 4.21X 1 1
M 33-40 373 8.142 205 54.961 39 8.431 31 8.241 0 2
n 41-55 315 6.87S 133 42.221 42 7.49S 35 7.77 0 2
N 56-64 32 0.70X 17 53.13X 28 0.521 26 0.60X 0 2
9 65 & over 12 0.26X 1 8.33 12 O.091 18 0.15X 0 2
............................. ...... ....... ............... .oo...o....... ., .,. ....... .. ..... ......... -------
Total for: Group
HHm 4585 100.00X 2317 100.002 174538 100.001 140460 100.001 1870 5074
Percent of Grand Total 8.14X 4.11X 8.50X 8.06X
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By Group & Age/Sex
Group: HIN
Sex/Age People Union Salary 88 Salary 85 Before '85 Since '85
Total Percent Total Percent Average Percent Average Percent Average Average
........................................... ............... ..................................... .......
F 0-5. 10 4.13 3 30.00X 42 4.25X 36 4.29X 2 1
F 6-18 44 18.18 24 54.55X 41 18.41 35 17.98X 2 1
F 19-25 6 2.48 3 50.00X 40 2.421 35 2.50X 2 1
F 26-32 28 11.57 12 42.86X 37 10.58 31 10.36X 2 1
F 33-40 25 10.33 13 52.001 42 10.62X 35 10.33% 2 1
F 41-55 15 6.20X 5 33.33 47 7.21X 42 7.44X 2 1
F 65 & over 1 0.411 0 8 0.081 8 0.091 3 1
M 0-5 2 0.831 2 100.00X 38 0.771 32 0.74X 3 1
N 6-18 53 21.90X 22 41.51 43 22.89X 37 23.30X 2 1
M 19-25 3 1.241 1 33.33X 41 1.25 35 1.23 2 1
N 26-32 17 7.021 7 41.18X 39 6.73X 32 6.47X 3 2
N 33-40 22 9.09X 14 63.641 39 8.70X 34 8.73n 3 2
n 41-55 15 6.20X 7 46.671 40 6.04X 35 6.271 3 2
N 56-64 1 0.411 0 5 0.051 23 0.27X 4 2
............................. ...... ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ....... ........ ........
Total for: Group
nIN 242 100.00X 113 100.00X 9877 100.00X 8486 100.00X 592 300
Percent of Grand Total 0.43UX 0.20X 0.481 0.49X
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APPENDIX V
PLAN COSTS
202
PROGRAM PAYOR 1DEP 2EEP 3DEP EPONLY EM MEDICARE
YEAR 84
AEInDEP MEMBER 16.33 32.22 4.72
GMC MEMBER 11.67 41.24 10.00 21.67 51.24 30.18
INIAND MEMBER 28.93 43.02 10.00 38.93 53.02 30.82
KISER MEMBER 7.30 16.40 89.06 10.00 17.30 26.40 20.94
MAXICARE MEMBER 27.13 52.09 10.00 37.13 62.09 25.37
ROSS LOCS MEMBER 22.33 49.69 10.00 32.33 59.69 34.77
min 7.30 16.40 89.06 10.00 17.30 26.40 4.72
max 28.93 52.09 89.06 10.00 38.93 62.09 34.77
YEAR 85
SCE/DEP MEMBE 16.33 32.22 4.72
GMC MEMBER 22.45 65.06 10.00 32.45 75.06 30.18
CIGNA MEMBER 36.47 56.79 10.00 46.47 66.79 37.20
KAISER MEMER 13.32 28.44 107.12 10.00 23.32 38.44 25.55
MAXICARE MEMEER 34.13 65.64 10.00 44.13 75.64 26.78
RCSS LOOS MEME 24.96 55.05 10.00 34.96 65.05 34.77
INLAND MEMER 42.99 44.55 10.00 52.99 54.55 50.60
min 13.32 28.44 107.12 10.00 23.32 38.44 4.72
max 42.99 65.64 107.12 10.00 52.99 75.64 50.60
YEAR 86
SCE/DEP MEMBER 21.57 43.79 6.36
GMC MEMBER 9.29 15.94 10.00 19.29 25.94 23.10
CIGNA MEMBER 22.70 23.55 10.00 32.70 33.55 37.62
IISER MEMBER 0.00 0.00 77.56 10.00 10.00 10.00 27.38
MAXICARE MEMBER 13.23 19.40 10.00 23.23 29.40 20.11
ROSS MEMBER 10.38 21.96 10.00 20.38 31.69 35-68
INLAND MEM8ER 28.37 100.30 10.00 38.37 110.30 48.09
PACIFICARE MEMER 5.74 0.00 10.00 15.74 10.00 27.81
min 0.00 0.00 77.56 10.00 10.00 10.00 6.36
max 28.37 100.30 77.56 10.00 38.37 110.30 48.09
YEAR 87
SCE/DEP MEMBER 21.57 43.79 6.36
GMC MEMBER 9.29 15.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.00
CIGN MEMER 29.24 35.48 1.72 30.96 37.20 39.60
IKQISER MEIBER 0.00 0.00 76.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.77
MAXICARE MEMBER 15.63 24.25 0.00 2.13 10.75 27.01
ROS zrD MErMBR 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 39.65
INMAND MEMER 28.37 8.37 0.00 8.81 0.00 48.09
PACIFICE MEMER 20.29 1.74 0.00 13.72 0.00 70.43
HP/NEV MEMBER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 26.95
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.36
max 29.24 43.79 76.00 1.72 30.96 37.20 70.43
203
YEAR 88
SCO/DEP
CIGNA
AISER
MAXICARE
INLAND
PACCFIRE
HP/NEV
min
max
26.35
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
53.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.84 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
26.35 53.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.65
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
7.80
20.51
37.16
18.92
21.38
66.20
58.22
18.30
0.00 0.00 0.00 7.80
0.00 7.65 0.00 66.20
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0.00 4.72
max 42.99 100.30 107.12 10.00 52.99 110.30 70.43
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PAYQR 1F 2DP 3DEP E Y E~ EM MEDIC~RE~
PRORAM PAYCR 1DCTP 2EEP 3EUE EMPCNLY EMPI EMP2 MEDICARE
YEAR 84
GMC
INAND
KAISER
MAXICARE
ROSS C
128.92
128.92
128.92
128.92
128.92
128.92
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
18.88
18.88
18.88
18.88
18.88
18.88
67.03
82.42
128.92 62.66
78.91
78.07
128.86
147.78
128.02
144.27
143.80
173.95
211.36
191.58
207.83
204.49
min
max
65.36 128.92 128.92 62.66 128.02 173.95 18.88
65.36 128.92 128.92 82.42 147.78 211.36 18.88
YEAR 85
SCE/DEP
GC
CIGNA
KASER
MAXICARE
ROSS LDOS
INLAND
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
SCE 65.36
128.92
128.92
128.92
128.92
128.92
128.92
128.92
18.88
18.88
18.88
18.88
18.88
18.88
18.88
77.81
89.82
128.92 68.68
85.60
80.63
76.85
143.17
155.18
134.04
150.96
146.30
142.21
187.74
218.74
197.60
214.52
206.82
205.77
min
max
65.36 128.92 128.92 68.68 134.04 187.74 18.88
65.36 128.92 128.92 89.82 155.18 218.74 18.88
YEAR 86
SCE/DEP
GMC
CIGNA
KAISER
MAXICARE
ROS LOC
INIAND
PAIFICARE
86.26
86.26
86.26
84.24
86.26
86.26
86.26
86.26
175.16
175.16
175.16
168.48
175.16
175.16
175.16
149.48
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
85.55
96.80
175.16 74.24
85.60
86.98
81.93
81.44
171.81
183.06
158.48
171.86
173.58
168.19
167.70
260.71
271.97
242.72
260.76
258.94
165.16
230.92
min
max
84.24 149.48 175.16 74.24 158.48 165.16 25.45
86.26 175.16 175.16 96.80 183.06 271.97 25.45
YEAR 87
SCz/mm
GM
CIGA
KAISER
MAXICARE
ROSS LOW
NAND
PACICARE
HPEV
SCE 86.26
SCE 86.26
SCE 86.26
SCE 83.72
SCE 86.26
SCE 86.26
SCE 86.26
SCS 86.26
SCE 84.10
175.16
175.16
175.16
167.44
175.16
168.19
175.16
175.16
168.20
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
25.45
95.55
111.49
83.72
97.99
82.44
91.93
104.92
84.10
191.10
197.75
167.44
197.75
164.88
197.75
197.75
168.20
286.65
286.65
251.16
286.65
247.33
275.46
281.82
246.61
175.16
in 83.72 167.44 175.16 82.44 164.88 246.61 25.45
86.26 175.16 175.16 111.49 197.75 286.65 25.45
205
y/
YEAR 88
105.39
95.55
91.40
94.08
103.93
102.54
105.39
89.99
213.99
191.10
176.60
188.16
203.40
197.72
191.36
179.37
95.55
86.56
87.87
99.85
102.54
113.54
89.99
89.99 176.60
105.39 213.99
191.10
173.12
175.74
203.68
197.72
219.12
179.37
286.65
259.70
263.61
303.08
286.60
304.90
267.19
31.19
31.19
31.19
31.19
31.19
31.19
31.19
31.19
86.56 173.12 259.70 31.19
113.54 219.12 304.90 31.19
min 65.36 128.92 128.92 62.66 128.02 165.16 18.88
max 105.39 213.99 175.16 113.54 219.12 304.90 31.19
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SWEEP
MC
CiI
UAND
PAICARE
HP/NEV
min
max
APPENDIX VI
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
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> * VERA** ************
> * OVERALL SATISFACTION *
> *********************************
CODE1<AA
CODE2<AC
CODE3<AE
COVERAGE HISTORY<
RELATION TO SUBSCRIBER <AG> NAME <AH > FS<AI>
STATED HISTORY<AJ >
Please respond to the following statemen based on the following scale:
2-STRONGi AGREE 3-AGREE 4-NEUTRAL
5-DISAGREE 6-STRONGLY DIS E
/ , %I~, _' I C
I am very satisfied--
With regards to the medical care I have received
overall, with the routine care I have received
overall, with the specialty care I have received
overall, with the emergency care I have received
Overall, with the care my dependents have received
PRIOR
<AK>
<AM>
<AO>
<AQ>
<AS>
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1988
<AL>
<AN>
<AP>
<AR>
<AT>
*** SPECIFIC CARE ISSUES ***
PRIOR
FOR ROUTINE CARE--
1988
Did you have need for use of routine services < > yes/no < >
What was the travel time (minutes) <AU>
What was the appointment backlog (days) <AW>
What was the waiting time at the office for the provider <AY>
What was the out-of-pocket cost (nuisance fee) per visit <Aa>
(dollars)
How would you rate the paperwork/hassle factor per visit <Ac>
1--LOW 10--HIGH
minutes
days
minutes
dollars
<AV>
<AX>
<AZ>
<Ab>
SOCIAL <AB
PHONE <AD
1-10 <Ad>
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FOR EMERGENCY CARE--
Did you have need for emergency services < > yes/no < >
What was the travel time (minutes) <Ae>
What was the waiting time for services (minutes) <Ag>
What was the out-of-pocket cost (nuisance fee) per visit <Ai>
(dollars)
How would you rate the paperwork/hassle factor per visit <Ak>
1--LOW 10--HIGH
minutes <Af>
days <Ah>
dollars <Aj>
1-10 <Al>
*** SPECIFIC CARE ISSUES ***
FOR DEPENDENT CARE-- 1988PRIOR
H many dependents are covered by health insurance <Am>
Did you have need for dependent services < >
What was the travel time (minutes) <Ao>
What was the appointment backlog (days) <Aq>
What was the waiting time at the office for the provider <As>
What was the out-of-pocket cost (nuisance fee) per visit <Au>
How would you rate the paperwork/hassle factor per visit <Aw>
1--LOW 10--HIGH
FOR OUTSIDE CARE--
number <An>
yes/no < >
minutes
days
minutes
dollars
1-10
PRIOR
Did you obtain health services outside of your plan?
How often?
<Ay> yes/no
<BA> times
<Ap>
<Ar>
<At>
<Av>
<Ax>
1988
<Az>
<BB>
Were those services covered by your plan?
How important were those services in determining your
present health care arrangements? 1--LOW 10--HIGH
Would you use these services more if you were not
satisfied with your health care arrangements?
Would you use your present arrangement less if you were
<BC> yes/no
<BE> 1-10
unsatisfied?
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PRIOR 1988
<BD>
<BF>
<BG>
<BH>
yes/no
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*** SPECIFIC PROVIDER ISSUES ***
I had to change providers to switch health care plans
I am satisfied--
With the physicians available to me
With the nurses/nurse practitioners available to me
<BI> yes/no <BJ>
<BK> 1-7 <BL>
<BM> 1-7 <BN>
*** SPECIFIC SERVICE ISSUES ***
PRIOR
I am satisfied--
W h availability of appointment times <BO>
With availability of medical information/advice by phone <BQ>
With access to specialty services**, if needed <BS>
With access to hospital care, if needed <BU>
With access to emergency care, when needed <BW>
With the support staff I have had contact with <BY>
With the facility(ies) at which I receive care <Ba>
Who determines the health care arrangements for your family? <
How is this decision reached?
*** REASONS FOR SWITCHING ***
**
<Bc OPEN ENDED RESPONSES GO HERE
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1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1-7
1988
<BP>
<BR>
<BT>
<BV>
<BX>
<BZ>
<Bb>
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*** PERSONAL INFORMATION ***
Highest level of education completed by member? <Bd>
Highest level of education completed by spouse? <Be>
1--GRADE SCHOOL 2--SOME HIGH SCHOOL 3--HIGH SCHOOL 4--SOME COLLEGE
5--COLLEGE 6--MASTERS 7--OTHER GRADUATE TRAINING
DUAL? <a> Family income <Bf>
(1) $0-$10,000
(2) $10,001-$15,000
(3) $15,001-$20,000
(4) $20,001-$25,000
(5) $25,001-$30,000
(6) $30,001-$35,000
(7) $35,001-$40,000
(P $40,001-$50,000
over $50,000
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